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Using account-level credit card data from six major commercial banks from January 2009 to December 
2013, we apply machine-learning techniques to combined consumer tradeline, credit bureau, and macroe- 
conomic variables to predict delinquency. In addition to providing accurate measures of loss probabilities 
and credit risk, our models can also be used to analyze and compare risk management practices and the 
drivers of delinquency across banks. We ﬁnd substantial heterogeneity in risk factors, sensitivities, and 
predictability of delinquency across banks, implying that no single model applies to all six institutions. 
We measure the eﬃcacy of a bank’s risk management process by the percentage of delinquent accounts 
that a bank manages effectively, and ﬁnd that eﬃcacy also varies widely across institutions. These results 
suggest the need for a more customized approached to the supervision and regulation of ﬁnancial in- 
stitutions, in which capital ratios, loss reserves, and other parameters are speciﬁed individually for each 
institution according to its credit risk model exposures and forecasts. 
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a  1. Introduction 
The ﬁnancial crisis of 20 07–20 09 highlighted the importance of
risk management within ﬁnancial institutions. Particular attention
has been given to the risk management practices and policies at
the mega-sized banks at the center of the crisis in the popular
press and the academic literature. Few dispute that risk manage-
ment at these institutions—or the lack thereof—played a central
role in shaping the subsequent economic downturn. Despite this
recent focus, however, the risk management policies of individual
institutions largely remain black boxes. 
In this paper, we examine the practice and implications of
risk management at six major U.S. ﬁnancial institutions, using
computationally intensive “machine-learning” techniques applied
to an unprecedentedly large sample of account-level credit card
data. The consumer credit market is central to understanding
risk management at large institutions for two reasons. First, con- Disclaimer: The statements made and views expressed herein are solely those of 
the authors and do not necessarily represent oﬃcial policies, statements, or views 
of AlphaSimplex Group, the Oﬃce of the Comptroller of the Currency, MIT, RPI, 
Washington University, or their employees and aﬃliates. 
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankﬁn.2016.07.015 
0378-4266/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article uumer credit in the United States has grown explosively over
he past three decades, totaling $3.3 trillion at the end of 2014.
rom the early 1980s to the Great Recession, U.S. household debt
s a percentage of disposable personal income has doubled, al-
hough declining interest rates have meant that debt service ratios
ave grown at a lower rate. Second, algorithmic decision-making
ools, including the use of scorecards based on "hard" information,
ave become increasingly common in consumer lending ( Thomas,
0 0 0 ). Given the larger amount of data, as well as the larger num-
er of decisions compared to commercial credit lending, this new
eliance on algorithmic decision-making should not be surprising.
owever, the implications of these tools for risk management, for
ndividual ﬁnancial institutions and their investors, and for the
conomy as a whole, are still unclear. 
Credit card accounts are revolving credit lines, and because of
his, lenders and investors have more options to actively monitor
nd manage them compared to other retail loans, such as mort-
ages. Consequently, managing credit card portfolios is a potential
ource of signiﬁcant value to ﬁnancial institutions. Better risk
anagement could provide ﬁnancial institutions with savings on
he order of hundreds of millions of dollars annually. For example,
enders could cut or freeze credit lines on accounts that are likely
o go into default, thereby reducing their exposure. By doing so,nder the CC BY license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ). 
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T  hey potentially avoid an increase in the balances of accounts
estined to default, known in the industry as “run-up.” However,
utting these credit lines to reduce run-up also runs the risk of
utting the credit limits of accounts that will not default, thereby
lienating customers and potentially forgoing proﬁtable lending
pportunities. More accurate forecasts of delinquencies and de-
aults reduce the likelihood of such false positives. Issuers and
nvestors of securitized credit card debt would also beneﬁt from
uch forecasts and tools. Finally, given the size of this part of the
ndustry—$861 billion of revolving credit outstanding at the end
f 2014—more accurate forecasts would improve macroprudential
olicy decisions, and reduce the likelihood of a systemic shock to
he ﬁnancial system. 
Our data allow us to observe the actual risk management ac-
ions undertaken by each bank at the account level, for example,
redit line decreases and realized run-ups over time — and thus
etermine the possible cost savings to the bank for a given risk
anagement strategy. The cross-sectional nature of our data fur-
her allows us to compare risk management practices across insti-
utions, and examine how actively and effectively different ﬁrms
anage the exposure of their credit card portfolios. We ﬁnd sig-
iﬁcant heterogeneity in the credit line management actions across
ur sample of six institutions. 
We compare the eﬃcacy of an institution’s risk management
rocess using a simple measure: the ratio of the percentage of
redit line decreases on accounts that become delinquent over a
orecast horizon, to the percentage of credit line decreases on all
ccounts over the same period. This measures the extent to which
nstitutions are targeting “bad” accounts, and managing their ex-
osure prior to default. 1 We ﬁnd that this ratio ranges from less
han one, implying that the bank was more likely to cut the lines
f good accounts than those that eventually went into default, to
ver 13, implying the bank was highly accurate in targeting bad ac-
ounts. While these ratios vary over time, the cross-sectional rank-
ng of the institutions remains relatively constant, suggesting that
ertain ﬁrms are either better at forecasting delinquent accounts,
r view line cuts as a beneﬁcial risk management tool. 
Because effective im plementation of the above risk manage-
ent strategies requires banks to be able to identify accounts
hat are likely to default, we build predictive models to classify
ccounts as good or bad. The dependent variable is an indicator
ariable equal to 1 if an account becomes 90 days past due (delin-
uent) over the next two, three, or four quarters. Independent
ariables include individual account characteristics such as the
urrent balance, utilization rate, and purchase volume; individual
orrower characteristics obtained from a large credit bureau, in-
luding the number of accounts an individual has outstanding, the
umber of other accounts that are delinquent, and the credit score;
nd macroeconomic variables including home prices, income, and
nemployment statistics. In all, we construct 87 distinct variables. 
Using these variables, we compare three modeling techniques:
ogistic regression, decision trees using the C4.5 algorithm, and
he random forests method. The models are all tested out of
ample as if they were implemented at that point in time, i.e., no
uture data were used as inputs in these tests. All models perform
easonably well, but the decision tree models tend to perform the
est in terms of classiﬁcation rates. In particular, we compare the
odels based on the well-known measures of precision and recall,
nd measures that combine them, the F -measure and the kappa
2 tatistic. We ﬁnd that the decision trees and random forest 
1 Despite the unintentionally pejorative nature of this terminology, we adopt the 
ndustry convention in referring to accounts that default or become delinquent as 
bad” and those that remain current as “good.”
2 Precision is deﬁned as the proportion of positives identiﬁed by a technique 
hat are truly positive. Recall is the proportion of positives that is correctly iden- 
t
i
m
t
sodels outperform logistic regression with respect to both sets of
easures. 
There is a great deal of cross-sectional and temporal hetero-
eneity in these models. As expected, the performance of all mod-
ls declines as the forecast horizon increases. However, the perfor-
ance of the models for each bank remains relatively stable over
ime. 3 Across banks, we ﬁnd a great deal of heterogeneity in classi-
cation accuracy. For example, at the two-quarter forecast horizon,
he mean F -measure ranges from 63.8% at the worst performing
ank to 81.6% at the best. 4 Kappa statistics show similar variability.
We also estimate the potential cost savings from active risk
anagement using these machine-learning models. The basic es-
imation strategy is to classify accounts as good or bad using the
bove models, and then to cut the credit lines of the bad accounts.
he cost savings will depend on the model accuracy and how ag-
ressively a bank will cut its credit lines. However, this strategy
ncurs a potential cost by cutting the credit lines of good accounts,
hereby alienating customers and losing future revenue. We follow
handani et al. (2010) methodology to estimate the “value added”
f our models, and report the cost savings for various degrees of
ine cuts, ranging from no cuts to cutting the account limit to the
urrent balance. To include the cost of alienating customers, we
onservatively assume that customers incorrectly classiﬁed as bad
ill pay off their current balances and close their accounts, the
ank losing out on all future revenues from such customers. 
Ultimately, this measure represents the savings a bank would
ealize by freezing credit lines of all accounts forecast by our mod-
ls to default, relative to what the bank would have saved if it had
erfect foresight, cutting credit limits on all and only bad accounts.
s such, it is representative only of the potential savings from the
peciﬁc risk management activity we discuss in the paper (i.e., cut-
ing credit lines), and it should not be interpreted as a percentage
avings on the entire credit card portfolio, which includes revenues
rom other sources, including interest and purchase fees. 
With respect to this measure, we ﬁnd that our models perform
ell. Assuming that cutting the lines of bad accounts would save
 run-up of 30% of the current balance, we ﬁnd that our deci-
ion tree models would save about 55% of the potential beneﬁts
elative to perfect risk management, compared to taking no ac-
ion for the two-quarter horizon forecasts (this includes the costs
ncurred in cutting the lines of good accounts). When we ex-
end the forecast horizon, the models do not perform as well, and
he cost savings decline to about 25% and 22% at the three- and
our-quarter horizons, respectively. These results vary considerably
cross banks. The bank with the greatest cost savings had a value
dded of 76%, 46%, and 35% across the forecast horizons; the bank
ith the smallest cost savings would only stand to gain 47%, 14%,
nd 9% by implementing our models across the three horizons. Of
ourse, there are many other aspects of a bank’s overall risk man-
gement program, so the quality of risk management strategy of
hese banks cannot be ranked solely on the basis of these results,
ut the results do suggest that there is substantial heterogeneity
n the risk management tools and effective strategies available to
anks. 
Khandani et al. (2010) is the paper most like ours in apply-
ng machine-learning tools to very large ﬁnancial datasets. Our
aper is differentiated from Khandani et al. in two signiﬁcant ways.
he ﬁrst is that, unlike Khandani et al. (2010) who focus on aiﬁed. The F -measure is deﬁned as the harmonic mean of precision and recall, and 
s meant to describe the balance between precision and recall. The kappa statistic 
easures performance relative to random classiﬁcation. See Fig. 1 for further de- 
ails. 
3 We test the models semi-annually, starting in 2010Q4 through the end of our 
ample period in 2013Q4. 
4 These F -measures represent the mean F -measure for a given bank over time. 
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6 We also drew samples at December 2011 and December 2012. Our results us- 
ing those samples are quite similar. When we test the models, our out-of-time test 
sample extends to 2014Q2 for our measure of delinquency. 
7 While modern computing can handle increasingly large datasets for machine- 
learning algorithms, we are limited to a 2.5% sample in the data construction phase. 
In particular, our raw data (full time horizon of monthly data for all sizes of banks, 
plus the quarterly credit bureau data) is about 30 TB, which we have to clean, single bank, we have data on a cross-section of banks. There-
fore, we compare models for forecasting defaults across banks,
and also compare risk management across the same banks. An-
other advantage of the cross-section of banks is our ability to com-
pare the drivers of delinquency across the different banks. One set
of drivers we look at are macroeconomic variables. On the other
hand, Khandani et al. (2010) have a signiﬁcantly richer dataset for
the single bank in that they have account level transactions on
credit and debit cards as well as balance information on checking
accounts and CDs. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 ,
we describe our dataset, and discuss the security issues surround-
ing it and the sample selection process used. In Section 3 , we out-
line the model speciﬁcations and our approach to constructing use-
ful variables that serve as inputs to the algorithms we employ. We
also describe the machine-learning framework for creating more
powerful forecast models for individual banks, and present our
empirical results. We apply these results to analyze bank risk man-
agement and the key risk drivers across banks in Section 4 . We
conclude in Section 5 . 
2. Data 
A major U.S. ﬁnancial regulator has engaged in a large-scale
project to collect detailed credit card data from several large U.S.
ﬁnancial institutions. As detailed below, the data contains inter-
nal account-level data from the banks merged with consumer
data from a large U.S. credit bureau, comprising over 500 mil-
lion records of individual accounts over a period of 6 years. It
is a unique dataset that combines the detailed data available to
individual banks with the beneﬁts of cross-sectional comparisons
across banks. 
The underlying data contained in this dataset is conﬁdential,
and therefore has strict terms and conditions surrounding its usage
and dissemination of results to ensure the privacy of the individu-
als and the institutions involved in the study. A third-party vendor
is contracted to act as the intermediary between the reporting ﬁ-
nancial institutions, the credit bureau, and the regulatory agency,
and end-users at the regulatory agency are not able to identify any
individual consumers from the data. We are also prohibited from
presenting results that would allow the identiﬁcation of the banks
from which the data are collected. 
2.1. Unit of analysis 
The credit card dataset is aggregated from two subsets we re-
fer to as account-level and credit bureau data. The account-level
data is collected from six large U.S. ﬁnancial institutions. It con-
tains account-level (tradeline) variables for each individual credit
card account on the institutions’ books, and is reported monthly
starting January 2008. The credit bureau data is obtained from a
major credit bureau, and contains information on individual con-
sumers reported quarterly starting the ﬁrst quarter of 2009. 
This process results in a merged dataset containing 186 raw
data items (106 account-level items and 80 credit bureau items).
The account-level data includes items such as month-ending bal-
ance, credit limit, borrower income, borrower credit score, pay-
ment amount, account activity, delinquency, etc. The credit bureau
data includes consumer-level variables such as total credit limit,
total outstanding balance on all cards, number of delinquent ac-
counts, etc. 5 
We then augment the credit card data with macroeconomic
variables at the county and state level, using data from the Bureau5 The credit bureau data for individuals is often referred to as “attributes” in the 
credit risk literature. 
m
w
uf Labor Statistics (BLS) and Home Price Index (HPI) data from the
ederal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). The BLS data are at the
ounty level, taken from the State and Metro Area Employment,
arnings, and Hours (SM) series and the Local Area Unemployment
LA) series, each of which is collected under the Current Employ-
ent Statistics program. The HPI data are at the state level. The
LS data are matched using ZIP codes. 
Given the conﬁdentiality restrictions of the data, the unit of
nalysis in our models is the individual account. Although the
ata has individual account-level and credit bureau information,
e cannot link multiple accounts to a single consumer. That is,
e cannot determine if two individual credit card accounts belong
o the same individual. However, the credit bureau data does al-
ow us to determine the total number of accounts that the owner
f each of the individual accounts has outstanding. Similarly, we
annot determine unique credit bureau records, and thus we have
ultiple records for some individuals. For example, if individual A
as ﬁve open credit cards from two ﬁnancial institutions, we are
ot able to trace those accounts back to individual A. However, for
ach of the ﬁve account-level records, we would know from the
redit bureau data that the owner of each of the accounts has a
otal of ﬁve open credit card accounts. 
.2. Sample selection 
The data collection by the ﬁnancial regulator started in January
008 for supervisory purposes. For regulatory reasons, the banks
rom which the data have come have changed over time, although
he total number has stayed at eight or less. However, the collec-
ion has always covered the bulk of the credit card market. Merg-
rs and acquisitions have also altered its population over this pe-
iod. 
Our ﬁnal sample consists of six ﬁnancial institutions, chosen
ecause they have reliable data spanning our sample period. Al-
hough data collection commenced in January 2008, our sample
tarts in 2009Q1 to coincide with the start of the credit bureau
ata collection. Our sample period runs through the end of 2013. 6 
The very large size of the dataset has forced us to draw a ran-
omized subsample from the entire population of data. For the
argest banks in our dataset, we sample 2.5% of the raw data. How-
ver, as there is substantial heterogeneity in the size of the credit
ard portfolios across the institutions, we sample 10%, 20%, and
0% from the smallest three banks in our sample. The reason is
imply to render the sample sizes comparable across banks, so
hat differences in the amount of data available for the machine-
earning algorithms are not driving the results. 7 
These subsamples are selected using a simple random sampling
ethod. Starting with the January 2008 data, each of the credit
ard accounts is given an 18-digit unique identiﬁer based on the
ncrypted account number. The identiﬁers are simple sequences
tarting at some constant and increasing by one for each account.
he individual accounts retain their identiﬁers, and can therefore
e tracked over time. As new accounts are added to the sample
n subsequent periods, they are assigned unique identiﬁers that
ncrease by one for each account. 8 As accounts are charged off,erge, and sort. As such, we are practically limited by the size of the full dataset 
hen building the dataset and creating variables. 
8 For example, if a bank reported 100 credit card accounts in January 2008, the 
nique identiﬁers would be {C + 1, C + 2, …, C + 100}. If the bank then added 20 
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M
 old, or closed, they simply drop out of the sample, and the unique
dentiﬁer is permanently retired. We therefore have a panel dataset
hat tracks individual accounts through time, a necessary condition
or predicting delinquency, and also reﬂects changes in the ﬁnan-
ial institutions’ portfolios over time. 
Once the account-level sample is established, we merge it with
he credit bureau data. This process also requires care because the
eporting frequency and historical coverage differ between the two
atasets. In particular, the account-level data is reported monthly,
eginning in January 2008, while the credit bureau data is reported
uarterly, beginning in the ﬁrst quarter of 2009. We merge the
ata using the link ﬁle provided by the vendor at the monthly
evel to retain the granularity of the account-level data. Because we
erge the quarterly credit bureau data with the monthly account-
evel data, each credit bureau observation is repeated three times
n the merged sample. However, we retain only the months at the
nd of each quarter for our models in this paper. 
Finally, we merge the macroeconomic variables to our sample
sing the ﬁve-digit ZIP code associated with each account. While
e do not have a long time series in our sample, there is a sig-
iﬁcant amount of cross-sectional heterogeneity that we use to
dentify macroeconomic trends. For example, HPI is available at the
tate level, and several employment and wage variables are avail-
ble at the county level. Most of the macroeconomic variables are
eported quarterly, which allows us to capture short-term trends. 
The ﬁnal merged dataset retains roughly 70% of the credit card
ccounts. From here, we only retain personal credit cards. The size
f the sample across all banks increases steadily over time from
bout 5.7 million credit card accounts in 2009Q4 to about 6.6 mil-
ion in 2013Q4. 
. Empirical design and models 
In this section, we compare three basic types of credit card
elinquency models: decision trees, random forests, and regular-
zed logistic regression. In addition to running a series of “horse
aces” between the different models, we seek a better understand-
ng of the conditions under which each type of model may be
ore useful. In particular, we are interested in how the models
ompare over different time horizons and changing economic con-
itions, and across banks. 
We use the open-source software package Weka to run
ur machine-learning models. Weka offers a wide collection of
achine-learning algorithms for data mining (see http://www.cs.
aikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/ for more information). We start by giving
 brief overview of the three types of classiﬁers we use. For the
urposes of this discussion, we assume that we are solving a two-
lass classiﬁcation problem, so the learning algorithm takes as in-
ut a training dataset, consisting of pairs ( x , y ), where x ∈ X is
he feature or attribute vector (and can include categorical- as well
s real-valued variables), and y ∈ {0, 1}. The output of the learn-
ng algorithm is a mapping from X to y ∈ {0, 1} (or possibly, in
he case of logistic regression, to [0, 1] where the output repre-
ents Pr ( y = 1 ) ). We now brieﬂy describe the algorithms underly-
ng these three models. 
Decision trees are powerful models that can be viewed as par-
itions of the space X , with a speciﬁc prediction of y (either 0 or
) for each such partition. If the model partitions the space into k
utually exclusive regions R 1 , , R k , then the model returned by
 decision tree can be viewed as f ( x ) = ∑ k m =1 c m I[ x ∈ R m ] where
 m ∈ {0, 1} and I is an indicator function (see Hastie et al., 2009 ).
he partitioning is typically implemented through a series of hier-
rchical tests, thus the “tree” nomenclature. ore accounts in February 2008, the unique identiﬁers of these new accounts 
ould be {C + 101, C + 102, …, C + 120}. 
r  
e  
i  
g  While these models are rich and powerful, the space of deci-
ion trees is exponential on the number of features or attributes.
t is thus effectively impossible to search the whole tree space to
inimize any reasonable criterion on the in-sample training data.
herefore, most decision tree learning algorithms follow a greedy
rocedure, recursively partitioning the input space on the attribute
hat most reduces some measure of “impurity” on the examples
hat have ﬁltered down to that node of the tree. The most com-
only used measures of impurity are the Gini index and cross-
ntropy. We use Weka’s J48 classiﬁer, which implements the C4.5
lgorithm developed by Quinlan (1993) (see Frank et al., 2011 ),
hich uses the reduction in cross-entropy, called the information
ain. The other major procedure is that trees are typically re-
tricted in height by some combination of rules to tell the tree
hen to stop splitting into smaller regions (typically when a region
ontains some M or fewer training examples), and post-pruning the
ree after it has been fully constructed, which can be done in a
umber of different ways. This can be viewed as a form of regular-
zation, reducing model complexity and giving up some in-sample
erformance, in order to generalize better to out-of-sample data.
ince we use a relatively high value of M (see Section 4 ), we do
ot use post-pruning. 
A major beneﬁt of the decision tree model as a whole is its
nterpretability. While the greedy algorithm described above is
ot guaranteed to ﬁnd the best model in the space of models it
earches, greedy decision tree learners have been very successful
n practice because of the combination of speed and reasonably
ood out-of-sample classiﬁcation performance that they typically
chieve. However, this comes as a tradeoff. The major negative
f decision trees as a machine-learning algorithm is that they do
ot achieve state-of-the-art performance in out-of-sample classiﬁ-
ation ( Dietterich, 20 0 0 ; Hastie et al., 20 09 ). Unfortunately, models
hat do achieve better performance are typically much harder to
nterpret, a signiﬁcant negative for the domain of credit risk anal-
sis. In order to determine how much improvement may be possi-
le, we compare the decision tree models with one of these state-
f-the art techniques, namely random forests ( Breiman, 2001 ;
reiman and Cutler, 2004 ). 
A random forest classiﬁer is an ensemble method that com-
ines two important ideas in order to improve the performance
f decision trees, which are the base learners. The ﬁrst idea is bag-
ing, or bootstrap aggregation. Instead of learning a single deci-
ion tree, bagging resamples the training dataset with replacement
 times, and learns a new decision tree model on each of these
ootstrapped sample training sets. The classiﬁcation model is then
o allow all these T decision trees to vote on the classiﬁcation, us-
ng majority vote to decide on the predicted class. The big beneﬁt
f bagging is that it greatly reduces the variance of decision trees,
nd typically leads to signiﬁcant improvements in out-of-sample
lassiﬁcation performance. The second key idea of random forests
s to further reduce correlation among each of the induced trees by
rtiﬁcially restricting the set of features considered for each recur-
ive split. When learning each tree, as each recursive split is con-
idered, the random forest learner randomly selects some subset
f the features (for classiﬁcation tasks, typically the square root of
he total number of features), and only considers those features.
andom forests have been enormously successful empirically on
any out-of-sample classiﬁcation benchmarks in the last decade,
nd are considered among the best “out of the box” learning al-
orithms available today for general tasks ( Caruana and Niculescu-
ezil, 2006; Criminisi et al., 2012 ). 
Our third model is one that is more traditionally used in credit
isk modeling and prediction in the ﬁnance and economics lit-
rature: logistic regression . In order to provide a fair compar-
son to the aforementioned methods, we use a regularized lo-
istic regression model, which is known to perform better in
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Table 1 
Model timing. 
The ﬁrst column represents the start and end dates of the training data. The test 
period columns show the quarter in which the models are tested. All models are 
meant to simulate a bank’s actual forecasting problem as if they were at the test 
period start date. 
Training period Test period start 
Start–end 2Q forecast 3Q forecast 4Q forecast 
2009Q4–2010Q4 2011Q2 2011Q3 2011Q4 
2010Q2–2011Q2 2011Q4 2012Q1 2012Q2 
2010Q4–2011Q4 2012Q2 2012Q3 2012Q4 
2011Q2–2012Q2 2012Q4 2013Q1 2013Q2 
2011Q4–2012Q4 2013Q2 2013Q3 N/A 
2012Q2–2013Q2 2013Q4 N/A N/A 
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s  out-of-sample prediction. In particular, we apply a quadratic
penalty function to the weights learned in a logistic regression
model (a ridge logistic regression). We use the Weka implemen-
tation of logistic regression as per Cessie and van Houwelingen
(1992) . The log-likelihood is expressed as the following logistic
function: 
l ( β) = 
∑ 
i 
[ y i log p ( x i ) + ( 1 − y i ) log ( 1 − p ( x i ) ) ] 
where p( x i ) = e 
x i β
1+ e x i β
. The objective function is then l(β) − λβ2 
where λ is the regularization or ridge parameter. The objective
function is minimized using a quasi-Newton method. 
In all, we have 87 attributes (variables) in our models, com-
posed of account-level, credit bureau, and macroeconomic data. 9 
We acknowledge that, in practice, banks tend to segment their
portfolios into distinct categories when using logistic regression,
and estimate different models on each segment. However, for our
analysis, we do not perform any such segmentation. Our rationale
is that our performance metric is solely based on classiﬁcation ac-
curacy. While it may be true that segmentation results in models
that are more tailored to individual segments, such as prime versus
subprime borrowers, thus potentially increasing forecast accuracy,
we relegate this case to future research. For our current purposes,
the number of attributes should be suﬃcient to approach the max-
imal forecast accuracy using logistic regression. We also note that
decision tree models are well suited to aid in the segmentation
process, and thus could be used in conjunction with logistic re-
gression, but again leave this for future research. 10 
3.1. Attribute selection 
Although there are few papers in the literature that have de-
tailed account-level data to benchmark our features, we believe
we have selected a set that adequately represents current indus-
try standards, in part based on our collective experience. Glennon
et al. (2008) is one of the few papers with data similar to ours.
These authors use industry experience and institutional knowledge
to select and develop account-level, credit bureau, and macroe-
conomic attributes. We start by selecting all possible candidate
attributes that can be replicated from Glennon et al. (2008) . Al-
though we cannot replicate all of their attributes, we do have the
majority of those that are shown to be signiﬁcant after their selec-
tion process. 
We also merge macroeconomic variables to our sample using
the ﬁve-digit ZIP code associated with the account. As mentioned
in Section 2 , while we do not have a long time series of macroe-
conomic trends in our sample, there is a signiﬁcant amount of
cross-sectional heterogeneity that we use to pick up macroeco-
nomic trends. 
3.2. Dependent variable 
Our dependent variable is delinquency status. For the purposes
of this study, we deﬁne delinquency as a credit card account
greater than or equal to 90 days past due. This differs from the
standard accounting rule by which banks typically charge off ac-
counts that are 180 days or more past due. However, it is rare for
an account that is 90 days past due to be recovered, and there-
fore it is common practice within the industry to use 90 days
past due as a conservative deﬁnition of default. This deﬁnition is9 We refer to our variables as attributes, as is common in the machine-learning 
literature. 
10 Another reason for not differentiating across segments is that the results might 
reveal the identity of the banks to knowledgeable industry insiders. The same con- 
cern arises with the size of the portfolio. 
p  
q  
2
slso consistent in the literature (see, e.g., Glennon et al., 2008 and
handani et al., 2010 ). We forecast all of our models over three
ifferent time horizons—two, three, and four quarters out—to clas-
ify whether or not an account becomes delinquent within those
orizons. 
.3. Model timing 
To predict delinquency, we estimate separate machine-learning
odels every 6 months, starting with the period ending 2010Q4. 11 
e estimate these models at each point in time as if we were
n that time period, i.e., no future data is ever used as inputs to
 model, and we require a historical training period and a fu-
ure testing period. For example, a model for 2010Q4 is trained
n data up to and including 2010Q4, but no further. Table 1 de-
nes the dates for the training and test samples of each of our
odels. 
The optimal length of the training window involves a tradeoff
etween increasing the amount of training data available and the
tationarity of the training data (hence its relevance for predict-
ng future performance). We use a rolling window of 2 years as
he length of the training window to balance these two consider-
tions. In particular, we combine the data from the most recent
uarter with the data from 12 months earlier to form a training
ample. For example, the model trained on data ending in 2010Q4
ontains the monthly credit-card accounts in 2009Q4 and 2010Q4.
he average training sample thus contains about two million indi-
idual records, depending on the institution and the time period.
n fact, these rolling windows incorporate up to 24 months of in-
ormation each because of the lag structure of some of the vari-
bles (e.g., the year over year change in the HPI), and an additional
2-month period over which an account could become 90 days
elinquent. 
.4. Measuring performance 
The goal of our delinquency prediction models is to classify
redit card accounts into two categories: accounts that become 90
ays or more past due within the next n quarters (“bad” accounts),
nd accounts that do not (“good” accounts). Therefore, our mea-
ure of performance should reﬂect the accuracy with which our
odel classiﬁes the accounts into these two categories. 
One common way to measure performance of such binary clas-
iﬁcation models is to calculate precision and recall. In our model,
recision is deﬁned as the number of correctly predicted delin-
uent accounts divided by the predicted number of delinquent11 That is, we build models for the periods ending in 2010Q4, 2011Q2, 2011Q4, 
012Q2, 2012Q4, and 2013Q2. 2013Q2 is our last model because we need an out-of- 
ample test period to test our forecasts; it is used only for the two-quarter models. 
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Fig. 1. Performance statistics. The ﬁgure shows a sample confusion matrix and deﬁnes our performance statistics. 
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Table 2 
Sample description. 
The table shows the total number of accounts over time. 
The six banks’ data are combined to show the aggregate 
each quarter. 
Date Number of accounts (10 0 0 ′ s) 
2009Q4 5696 
2010Q2 5677 
2010Q4 5787 
2011Q2 5960 
2011Q4 5306 
2012Q2 6300 
2012Q4 6580 
2013Q2 6643 
2013Q4 6604 
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r  ccounts, while recall is deﬁned as the number of correctly pre-
icted delinquent accounts divided by the actual number of delin-
uent accounts. Precision is meant to gauge the number of false
ositives (accounts predicted to be delinquent that stayed current)
hile recall gauges the number of false negatives (accounts pre-
icted to stay current that actually went into default). 
We also consider two statistics that combine precision and re-
all, the F -measure and the kappa statistic. The F -measure is de-
ned as the harmonic mean of precision and recall, and assigns
igher values to methods that achieve a reasonable balance be-
ween precision and recall. The kappa statistic measures perfor-
ance relative to random classiﬁcation, and can be thought of
s the improvement over expected accuracy given the distribu-
ion of positive and negative examples. According to Khandani
t al. (2010) and Landis and Koch (1977) , a kappa statistic above
.6 represents substantial performance. Fig. 1 summarizes the def-
nitions of these classiﬁcation performance statistics measures in a
o-called “confusion matrix.”
In the context of credit card portfolio risk management, how-
ver, there are account-speciﬁc costs and beneﬁts associated with
he classiﬁcation decision that these performance statistics fail to
apture. In the management of existing lines of credit, the primary
eneﬁt of classifying bad accounts before they become delinquent
s to save the lender the run-up that is likely to occur between
he current time period and the time at which the borrower goes
nto default. On the other hand, there are costs associated with in-
orrectly classifying accounts as well. For example, the bank may
lienate customers and lose out on potential future business and
roﬁts on future purchases. 
To account for these possible gains and losses, we use a cost-
ensitive measure of performance to compute the value added of
ur classiﬁer, as in Khandani et al. (2010) , by assigning different
osts to false positives and false negatives, and approximating the
otal savings that our models would have brought if they had been
mplemented. Our value added approach is able to assign a dollar-
er-account savings (or cost) of implementing any classiﬁcation
odel. From the lender’s perspective, this provides an intuitive and
ractical method for choosing between models. From a supervisory
erspective, we can assign deadweight costs of incorrect classiﬁca-
ions by aggregate risk levels to quantify systemic risk levels. 
Following Khandani et al. (2010) , our value added function
s derived from the confusion matrix. Ideally, we would like to
chieve 100% true positives and true negatives, implying correct
lassiﬁcation of all accounts, delinquent and current. However, any
ealistic classiﬁcation will have some false positives and false neg-
tives, which will incur costs. 
To quantify the value added of classiﬁcation, Khandani et al.
2010) deﬁne the proﬁt with and without a forecast as follows: l  no forecast = ( T P + F N ) B C P M − ( F P + T N ) B D (1) 
forecast = T P B C P M − F P B D − T N B C (2)
no forecast = T N ( B D − B C ) − F N B C P M (3) 
here B C is the current account balance; B D is the balance at de-
ault; P M is the proﬁtability margin; and TP, FN, FP , and TN are de-
ned according to the confusion matrix. Note that Eq. (3) is broken
own into a savings from lowering balances (the ﬁrst term) less a
ost of misclassiﬁcation (the second term). 
To generate a value added for each model, the authors then
ompare the savings from the forecast proﬁt ( P forecast ) with the
eneﬁt of perfect foresight. The savings from perfect foresight can
e calculated by multiplying the total number of bad accounts
 TN + FP ) by the run up ( B D – B C ). The ratio of the model forecast
avings ( Eq. (3) ) to the perfect foresight case can be written as: 
alue - Added 
(
B D 
B C 
, r, N 
)
= 
T N − F N 
[
1 − ( 1 + r ) −N 
][
B D 
B C 
− 1 
]−1 
T N + F P 
(4) 
here we substitute [ 1 − ( 1 + r ) −N ] for the proﬁtability margin, r
s the discount rate, and N is the discount period. 
. Classiﬁcation results 
In this section, we report the results of our classiﬁcation mod-
ls by bank and by time. There are on average about 6.1 million
ccounts each month in our sample. Table 2 shows the sample
izes over time. There is a signiﬁcant amount of heterogeneity in
elinquencies across institutions and time (see Fig. 2 ). Delinquency
ates necessarily increase with the forecast horizon, since the
onger horizons include the shorter ones. Annual delinquency rates
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Fig. 2. Relative delinquency rates over time. The ﬁgure shows the relative delin- 
quency rates over time. Due to data conﬁdentiality restrictions, we do not report 
the actual delinquency rates over time. Each line represents an individual bank over 
time. The delinquency rates are all reported relative to the bank with the lowest 
two quarter delinquency rate in 2010Q4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Model risk ranking versus credit score. The ﬁgure plots the model-derived 
risk ranking versus an account’s credit score at the time of the forecast for Bank 2. 
Accounts are rank-ordered based on a logistic regression model for a two-quarter 
forecast horizon. Green points are accounts that were current at the end of the 
forecast horizon; blue points are 30 days past due; yellow points are 60 days past 
due; and red points are 90 + days past due. (For interpretation of the references to 
color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.) 
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13 across banks range from 1.36% to 4.36%, indicating that the institu-
tions we are studying have very different underwriting and/or risk
management strategies. 
We run individual classiﬁcation models for each bank over
time; separate models are estimated for each forecast horizon for
each bank. Because our data ends in 2014Q2, we can only test
the three- and four-quarter-horizon models on the training periods
ending in 2012Q2 and 2012Q4, respectively. 12 
4.1. Nonstationary environments 
A fundamental concern for all prediction algorithms is gen-
eralization, i.e., whether models will continue to perform well
on out-of-sample data. This is particularly important when the
environment that generates the data is itself changing, and there-
fore the out-of-sample data is almost guaranteed to come from a
different distribution than the training data. This concern is partic-
ularly relevant for ﬁnancial forecasting, given the non-stationarity
of ﬁnancial data as well as the macroeconomic and regulatory
environments. Our sample period, which starts on the heels of
the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis and the ensuing recession, only heightens
these concerns. 
We address overﬁtting primarily by testing out-of-sample. Our
decision tree models also allow us to control the degree of in-
sample ﬁtting by controlling what is known as the pruning param-
eter, which we refer to as M . This parameter acts as the stopping
criterion for the decision tree algorithm. For example, when M = 2,
the algorithm will continue to attempt to add additional nodes to
the leaves of the tree until there are two instances (accounts) or
less on each leaf, and an additional node would be statistically sig-
niﬁcant. As M increases, the in-sample performance will degrade,
because the algorithm stops even though there may be poten-
tially statistically signiﬁcant splits remaining. However, the out-of-
sample performance may actually increase for a while because the12 For example, for the four-quarter forecast models with training data ending 
2012Q2, the dependent variable is deﬁned over the period 2012Q2 through 2013Q2, 
making the test date 2013Q2. We then need one year of data to test the model out- 
of-sample, which brings us to our last month of data coverage in 2014Q2. 
B
2
2
podes blocked by an increasing M are overﬁtting the sample. Even-
ually, however, even the out-of-sample performance degrades, as
 becomes suﬃciently high. 
To ﬁnd a suitable value of M for our machine-learning mod-
ls, we use data from a selected bank for validation. We test the
erformance for a set of possible M parameters between 2 and
0 0 0 for 15 different “clusters” of parameters used to calculate the
alue-added (run-up ratios, discount rates, etc.). We found that set-
ing M = 50 led to the best performance overall across clusters. Fur-
her, the results were not very sensitive for values of M between
5 and 250, indicating that the estimates and performance should
e robust with respect to this parameter setting. Sensitivity analy-
is for the other banks around M = 50 yielded similar results, and
n light of these, we use a pruning parameter of M = 50 in all of our
ecision tree models. 
.2. Model results 
In this section, we show the results of the comparison of our
hree modeling approaches: decision trees, logistic regression, and
andom forests. The random forest models are estimated with 20
andom trees. 13 
To preview the results, and to help visualize the effectiveness
f our models in discriminating between good and bad accounts,
e plot the model-derived risk ranking versus an account’s credit
core at the time of the forecast in Fig. 3 for Bank 2. Accounts
re rank-ordered based on a logistic regression model for a
wo-quarter forecast horizon. Green points represent accounts
hat were current at the end of the forecast horizon; blue points
epresent accounts 30 days past due; yellow points representThe C4.5 models produced unreliable results for the 4Q forecast horizon for 
ank 5 due to a low delinquency rate combined with accounts that were diﬃcult 
to classify (the corresponding logistic and random forest forecasts were the worst 
performing models). The random forest models for the 4Q forecast horizon for Bank 
 failed to converge in a reasonable amount of time (run-time was stopped after 
4 + hours at full capacity), so those results are omitted as well. Throughout the 
aper, those results are indicated with N/A. 
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Table 3 
Precision, recall, true positive rate, and false positive rates. 
The table shows the precision, recall, true positive rate, and false positive rate by bank, time, and forecast horizon for each model type. The statistics are deﬁned in Fig. 1 . 
The acceptance threshold is deﬁned as the threshold which maximizes the F -measure. 
Bank Test date C4.5 Decision trees Logistic regression Random forests 
Precision Recall True False Precision Recall True False Precision Recall True False 
positive positive positive positive positive positive 
rate rate rate rate rate rate 
Panel A: Two-quarter forecast horizon 
1 201106 71 .3% 63 .0% 99 .9% 37 .0% 17 .9% 59 .1% 99 .0% 40 .9% 68 .8% 67 .8% 99 .9% 32 .2% 
1 201112 62 .8% 70 .3% 99 .8% 29 .7% 26 .0% 70 .2% 98 .8% 29 .8% 65 .0% 68 .3% 99 .8% 31 .7% 
1 201206 65 .5% 67 .8% 99 .8% 32 .2% 62 .7% 60 .0% 99 .8% 40 .0% 64 .2% 69 .1% 99 .8% 30 .9% 
1 201212 68 .0% 65 .3% 99 .8% 34 .7% 62 .6% 62 .1% 99 .8% 37 .9% 66 .2% 67 .3% 99 .8% 32 .7% 
1 201306 68 .2% 59 .9% 99 .9% 40 .1% 58 .6% 59 .3% 99 .8% 40 .7% 58 .3% 70 .1% 99 .7% 29 .9% 
1 201312 67 .1% 65 .6% 99 .8% 34 .4% 60 .6% 64 .5% 99 .8% 35 .5% 64 .5% 69 .4% 99 .8% 30 .6% 
Average: 67 .2% 65 .3% 99 .8% 34 .7% 48 .1% 62 .5% 99 .5% 37 .5% 64 .5% 68 .7% 99 .8% 31 .3% 
2 201106 63 .7% 73 .0% 99 .4% 27 .0% 64 .2% 71 .5% 99 .4% 28 .5% 65 .9% 71 .1% 99 .4% 28 .9% 
2 201112 60 .5% 75 .9% 99 .2% 24 .1% 61 .9% 71 .3% 99 .3% 28 .7% 60 .5% 74 .2% 99 .2% 25 .8% 
2 201206 64 .8% 63 .5% 99 .4% 36 .5% 3 .1% 91 .8% 53 .9% 8 .2% 63 .4% 71 .2% 99 .3% 28 .8% 
2 201212 65 .7% 70 .7% 99 .4% 29 .3% 10 .0% 67 .7% 90 .4% 32 .3% 62 .0% 73 .9% 99 .3% 26 .1% 
2 201306 66 .5% 66 .8% 99 .5% 33 .2% 63 .6% 68 .6% 99 .4% 31 .4% 61 .7% 72 .3% 99 .3% 27 .7% 
2 201312 63 .2% 73 .0% 99 .3% 27 .0% 62 .7% 71 .2% 99 .3% 28 .8% 60 .8% 72 .6% 99 .2% 27 .4% 
Average: 64 .1% 70 .5% 99 .4% 29 .5% 44 .3% 73 .7% 90 .3% 26 .3% 62 .4% 72 .5% 99 .3% 27 .5% 
3 201106 79 .9% 88 .8% 99 .9% 11 .2% 75 .7% 81 .2% 99 .8% 18 .8% 80 .0% 87 .7% 99 .9% 12 .3% 
3 201112 69 .2% 92 .6% 99 .7% 7 .4% 72 .5% 82 .4% 99 .8% 17 .6% 80 .5% 85 .6% 99 .9% 14 .4% 
3 201206 81 .1% 84 .9% 99 .9% 15 .1% 73 .6% 81 .7% 99 .9% 18 .3% 83 .9% 79 .0% 99 .9% 21 .0% 
3 201212 79 .5% 85 .4% 99 .9% 14 .6% 72 .4% 79 .3% 99 .9% 20 .7% 79 .0% 85 .5% 99 .9% 14 .5% 
3 201306 71 .6% 90 .2% 99 .9% 9 .8% 70 .8% 80 .3% 99 .9% 19 .7% 70 .6% 90 .8% 99 .9% 9 .2% 
3 201312 74 .8% 88 .6% 99 .9% 11 .4% 70 .7% 84 .2% 99 .9% 15 .8% 70 .8% 90 .3% 99 .9% 9 .7% 
Average: 76 .0% 88 .4% 99 .9% 11 .6% 72 .6% 81 .5% 99 .9% 18 .5% 77 .5% 86 .5% 99 .9% 13 .5% 
4 201106 59 .4% 64 .9% 99 .7% 35 .1% 57 .2% 62 .3% 99 .7% 37 .7% 58 .7% 67 .2% 99 .7% 32 .8% 
4 201112 61 .2% 70 .0% 99 .8% 30 .0% 53 .1% 67 .1% 99 .7% 32 .9% 62 .4% 67 .3% 99 .8% 32 .7% 
4 201206 67 .4% 59 .0% 99 .9% 41 .0% 57 .6% 59 .3% 99 .8% 40 .7% 59 .0% 64 .6% 99 .8% 35 .4% 
4 201212 68 .6% 60 .5% 99 .9% 39 .5% 59 .0% 62 .1% 99 .8% 37 .9% 64 .0% 62 .1% 99 .8% 37 .9% 
4 201306 62 .3% 65 .1% 99 .8% 34 .9% 61 .5% 61 .3% 99 .8% 38 .7% 61 .3% 66 .9% 99 .8% 33 .1% 
4 201312 68 .9% 60 .7% 99 .9% 39 .3% 57 .5% 67 .1% 99 .8% 32 .9% 64 .6% 65 .6% 99 .9% 34 .4% 
Average: 64 .6% 63 .4% 99 .8% 36 .6% 57 .7% 63 .2% 99 .8% 36 .8% 61 .7% 65 .6% 99 .8% 34 .4% 
5 201106 69 .6% 72 .8% 99 .8% 27 .2% 64 .5% 71 .8% 99 .8% 28 .2% 67 .2% 76 .0% 99 .8% 24 .0% 
5 201112 66 .1% 72 .8% 99 .8% 27 .2% 65 .7% 69 .0% 99 .8% 31 .0% 64 .1% 76 .4% 99 .8% 23 .6% 
5 201206 70 .7% 64 .4% 99 .9% 35 .6% 66 .3% 62 .2% 99 .8% 37 .8% 65 .6% 72 .5% 99 .8% 27 .5% 
5 201212 66 .2% 75 .4% 99 .8% 24 .6% 63 .5% 72 .7% 99 .8% 27 .3% 66 .1% 74 .5% 99 .8% 25 .5% 
5 201306 68 .4% 71 .0% 99 .8% 29 .0% 68 .0% 68 .8% 99 .8% 31 .2% 66 .9% 75 .4% 99 .8% 24 .6% 
5 201312 63 .3% 77 .5% 99 .7% 22 .5% 66 .6% 70 .4% 99 .8% 29 .6% 64 .3% 75 .2% 99 .8% 24 .8% 
Average: 67 .4% 72 .3% 99 .8% 27 .7% 65 .7% 69 .1% 99 .8% 30 .9% 65 .7% 75 .0% 99 .8% 25 .0% 
6 201106 69 .7% 66 .5% 99 .9% 33 .5% 64 .6% 66 .4% 99 .8% 33 .6% 69 .9% 65 .9% 99 .9% 34 .1% 
6 201112 64 .0% 71 .1% 99 .8% 28 .9% 66 .0% 66 .9% 99 .8% 33 .1% 64 .5% 70 .6% 99 .8% 29 .4% 
6 201206 74 .7% 67 .6% 99 .8% 32 .4% 69 .9% 71 .2% 99 .8% 28 .8% 70 .9% 71 .4% 99 .8% 28 .6% 
6 201212 42 .8% 90 .4% 99 .1% 9 .6% 67 .9% 70 .2% 99 .8% 29 .8% 66 .4% 72 .9% 99 .7% 27 .1% 
6 201306 36 .2% 96 .2% 98 .7% 3 .8% 70 .6% 69 .5% 99 .8% 30 .5% 71 .7% 70 .2% 99 .8% 29 .8% 
6 201312 62 .8% 72 .5% 99 .7% 27 .5% 60 .9% 72 .3% 99 .7% 27 .7% 61 .8% 71 .7% 99 .7% 28 .3% 
Average: 58 .4% 77 .4% 99 .5% 22 .6% 66 .7% 69 .4% 99 .8% 30 .6% 67 .5% 70 .4% 99 .8% 29 .6% 
Panel B: Three-quarter forecast horizon 
1 201109 60 .3% 45 .8% 99 .7% 54 .2% 55 .8% 42 .0% 99 .7% 58 .0% 56 .0% 50 .0% 99 .7% 50 .0% 
1 201203 59 .0% 44 .5% 99 .7% 55 .5% 54 .5% 39 .3% 99 .7% 60 .7% 56 .3% 46 .1% 99 .7% 53 .9% 
1 201209 53 .8% 47 .6% 99 .6% 52 .4% 52 .4% 40 .1% 99 .6% 59 .9% 53 .4% 47 .4% 99 .6% 52 .6% 
1 201303 55 .6% 43 .3% 99 .7% 56 .7% 52 .0% 37 .7% 99 .7% 62 .3% 49 .5% 45 .4% 99 .6% 54 .6% 
1 201309 36 .9% 54 .0% 99 .1% 46 .0% 54 .4% 35 .4% 99 .7% 64 .6% 55 .7% 44 .1% 99 .6% 55 .9% 
Average: 53 .1% 47 .0% 99 .6% 53 .0% 53 .8% 38 .9% 99 .7% 61 .1% 54 .2% 46 .6% 99 .6% 53 .4% 
2 201109 52 .3% 51 .5% 98 .5% 48 .5% 54 .7% 45 .9% 98 .8% 54 .1% 55 .7% 48 .1% 98 .8% 51 .9% 
2 201203 55 .2% 42 .5% 98 .9% 57 .5% 46 .8% 48 .8% 98 .3% 51 .2% 48 .9% 47 .6% 98 .5% 52 .4% 
2 201209 47 .6% 56 .0% 98 .1% 44 .0% 5 .0% 80 .4% 52 .2% 19 .6% 50 .3% 52 .0% 98 .4% 48 .0% 
2 201303 51 .1% 45 .2% 98 .9% 54 .8% 9 .3% 49 .6% 87 .8% 50 .4% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2 201309 50 .8% 50 .8% 98 .4% 49 .2% 48 .3% 50 .9% 98 .2% 49 .1% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Average: 51 .4% 49 .2% 98 .6% 50 .8% 32 .8% 55 .1% 87 .0% 44 .9% 51 .7% 49 .3% 98 .6% 50 .7% 
3 201109 70 .1% 56 .4% 99 .7% 43 .6% 64 .7% 51 .8% 99 .6% 48 .2% 66 .8% 57 .8% 99 .6% 42 .2% 
3 201203 70 .6% 55 .4% 99 .8% 44 .6% 65 .2% 52 .9% 99 .7% 47 .1% 71 .2% 55 .3% 99 .8% 44 .7% 
3 201209 67 .4% 56 .8% 99 .7% 43 .2% 66 .3% 53 .1% 99 .7% 46 .9% 70 .8% 55 .8% 99 .8% 44 .2% 
3 201303 66 .7% 60 .3% 99 .8% 39 .7% 64 .8% 55 .1% 99 .8% 44 .9% 69 .4% 58 .1% 99 .8% 41 .9% 
3 201309 72 .8% 60 .8% 99 .8% 39 .2% 64 .1% 58 .9% 99 .7% 41 .1% 65 .7% 63 .6% 99 .7% 36 .4% 
Average: 69 .5% 58 .0% 99 .8% 42 .0% 65 .0% 54 .4% 99 .7% 45 .6% 68 .8% 58 .1% 99 .7% 41 .9% 
( continued on next page ) 
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Table 3 ( continued ) 
Bank Test date C4.5 Decision trees Logistic regression Random forests 
Precision Recall True False Precision Recall True False Precision Recall True False 
positive positive positive positive positive positive 
rate rate rate rate rate rate 
4 201109 46 .1% 48 .7% 99 .4% 51 .3% 46 .7% 43 .2% 99 .5% 56 .8% 52 .0% 44 .3% 99 .5% 55 .7% 
4 201203 25 .2% 56 .2% 98 .5% 43 .8% 46 .0% 41 .0% 99 .6% 59 .0% 52 .9% 42 .5% 99 .7% 57 .5% 
4 201209 53 .4% 39 .6% 99 .7% 60 .4% 43 .8% 43 .8% 99 .5% 56 .2% 47 .3% 44 .2% 99 .5% 55 .8% 
4 201303 51 .3% 38 .9% 99 .7% 61 .1% 48 .5% 37 .2% 99 .7% 62 .8% 45 .4% 43 .4% 99 .6% 56 .6% 
4 201309 46 .3% 46 .8% 99 .5% 53 .2% 44 .7% 47 .4% 99 .5% 52 .6% 54 .4% 43 .5% 99 .7% 56 .5% 
Average: 44 .5% 46 .0% 99 .4% 54 .0% 46 .0% 42 .5% 99 .5% 57 .5% 50 .4% 43 .6% 99 .6% 56 .4% 
5 201109 30 .6% 43 .8% 99 .2% 56 .2% 30 .2% 34 .6% 99 .3% 65 .4% 40 .0% 36 .5% 99 .5% 63 .5% 
5 201203 39 .9% 31 .2% 99 .6% 68 .8% 28 .8% 32 .4% 99 .4% 67 .6% 36 .1% 37 .1% 99 .5% 62 .9% 
5 201209 40 .4% 33 .7% 99 .6% 66 .3% 22 .9% 46 .6% 98 .7% 53 .4% 39 .3% 35 .8% 99 .5% 64 .2% 
5 201303 41 .0% 31 .2% 99 .7% 68 .8% 27 .1% 37 .4% 99 .2% 62 .6% 38 .9% 34 .5% 99 .6% 65 .5% 
5 201309 42 .1% 34 .6% 99 .6% 65 .4% 32 .6% 31 .4% 99 .4% 68 .6% 42 .2% 36 .1% 99 .6% 63 .9% 
Average: 38 .8% 34 .9% 99 .5% 65 .1% 28 .3% 36 .5% 99 .2% 63 .5% 39 .3% 36 .0% 99 .5% 64 .0% 
6 201109 48 .0% 46 .0% 99 .4% 54 .0% 48 .3% 39 .9% 99 .5% 60 .1% 56 .0% 42 .5% 99 .6% 57 .5% 
6 201203 52 .9% 43 .3% 99 .5% 56 .7% 47 .8% 42 .0% 99 .4% 58 .0% 53 .5% 45 .3% 99 .5% 54 .7% 
6 201209 42 .9% 55 .9% 98 .9% 44 .1% 52 .1% 48 .4% 99 .4% 51 .6% 58 .2% 51 .0% 99 .5% 49 .0% 
6 201303 58 .3% 42 .8% 99 .6% 57 .2% 54 .2% 43 .2% 99 .5% 56 .8% 59 .3% 44 .4% 99 .6% 55 .6% 
6 201309 47 .7% 51 .1% 99 .2% 48 .9% 48 .6% 50 .5% 99 .3% 49 .5% 54 .1% 49 .1% 99 .4% 50 .9% 
Average: 50 .0% 47 .8% 99 .3% 52 .2% 50 .2% 44 .8% 99 .4% 55 .2% 56 .2% 46 .4% 99 .5% 53 .6% 
Panel C: Four-quarter forecast horizon 
1 201112 52 .5% 38 .9% 99 .5% 61 .1% 26 .6% 38 .2% 98 .5% 61 .8% 48 .5% 42 .1% 99 .4% 57 .9% 
1 201206 54 .5% 36 .5% 99 .6% 63 .5% 44 .5% 35 .5% 99 .4% 64 .5% 50 .3% 39 .2% 99 .4% 60 .8% 
1 201212 49 .2% 39 .0% 99 .5% 61 .0% 45 .0% 34 .8% 99 .5% 65 .2% 48 .9% 40 .4% 99 .5% 59 .6% 
1 201306 53 .8% 34 .4% 99 .6% 65 .6% 47 .5% 29 .1% 99 .6% 70 .9% 48 .9% 35 .3% 99 .5% 64 .7% 
Average: 50 .5% 41 .0% 99 .6% 59 .0% 41 .1% 36 .3% 99 .3% 63 .7% 49 .9% 41 .3% 99 .5% 58 .7% 
2 201112 47 .3% 43 .1% 98 .0% 56 .9% 42 .1% 47 .7% 97 .2% 52 .3% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2 201206 53 .6% 40 .8% 98 .5% 59 .2% 6 .6% 86 .9% 46 .2% 13 .1% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2 201212 47 .1% 43 .6% 98 .2% 56 .4% 5 .6% 84 .3% 48 .4% 15 .7% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2 201306 51 .0% 39 .6% 98 .6% 60 .4% 12 .9% 51 .6% 86 .9% 48 .4% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Average: 48 .3% 46 .2% 98 .4% 53 .8% 22 .5% 64 .7% 75 .6% 35 .3% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
3 201112 63 .1% 47 .8% 99 .6% 52 .2% 62 .0% 43 .9% 99 .6% 56 .1% 64 .2% 47 .6% 99 .6% 52 .4% 
3 201206 63 .5% 41 .9% 99 .7% 58 .1% 58 .2% 41 .3% 99 .6% 58 .7% 68 .5% 40 .0% 99 .7% 60 .0% 
3 201212 57 .9% 44 .3% 99 .6% 55 .7% 49 .6% 40 .8% 99 .5% 59 .2% 57 .3% 46 .0% 99 .6% 54 .0% 
3 201306 60 .8% 43 .9% 99 .7% 56 .1% 53 .9% 44 .3% 99 .6% 55 .7% 63 .5% 42 .7% 99 .7% 57 .3% 
Average: 63 .1% 47 .8% 99 .7% 52 .2% 56 .7% 45 .8% 99 .6% 54 .2% 64 .8% 47 .2% 99 .7% 52 .8% 
4 201112 38 .8% 38 .8% 99 .2% 61 .2% 37 .0% 38 .8% 99 .1% 61 .2% 44 .3% 36 .0% 99 .4% 64 .0% 
4 201206 38 .2% 37 .8% 99 .2% 62 .2% 39 .3% 33 .6% 99 .3% 66 .4% 44 .4% 33 .4% 99 .4% 66 .6% 
4 201212 42 .9% 36 .8% 99 .4% 63 .2% 40 .2% 36 .2% 99 .3% 63 .8% 40 .6% 37 .4% 99 .3% 62 .6% 
4 201306 26 .3% 43 .4% 98 .4% 56 .6% 42 .5% 34 .7% 99 .4% 65 .3% 45 .3% 36 .4% 99 .4% 63 .6% 
Average: 39 .0% 39 .7% 99 .2% 60 .3% 40 .0% 36 .5% 99 .4% 63 .5% 43 .9% 37 .5% 99 .5% 62 .5% 
5 201112 N/A N/A N/A N/A 9 .1% 31 .2% 97 .7% 68 .8% 9 .5% 24 .7% 98 .3% 75 .3% 
5 201206 N/A N/A N/A N/A 8 .9% 9 .8% 99 .2% 90 .2% 11 .8% 16 .6% 99 .0% 83 .4% 
5 201212 N/A N/A N/A N/A 9 .7% 25 .8% 98 .2% 74 .2% 10 .8% 22 .0% 98 .6% 78 .0% 
5 201306 N/A N/A N/A N/A 8 .9% 33 .9% 97 .0% 66 .1% 10 .9% 24 .0% 98 .3% 76 .0% 
Average: N/A N/A N/A N/A 12 .8% 24 .5% 98 .3% 75 .5% 11 .2% 24 .9% 98 .5% 75 .1% 
6 201112 49 .9% 36 .0% 99 .4% 64 .0% 48 .1% 30 .7% 99 .4% 69 .3% 47 .0% 36 .8% 99 .3% 63 .2% 
6 201206 55 .7% 37 .6% 99 .4% 62 .4% 45 .0% 38 .8% 99 .0% 61 .2% 52 .3% 40 .9% 99 .2% 59 .1% 
6 201212 38 .9% 46 .0% 98 .6% 54 .0% 54 .0% 37 .5% 99 .4% 62 .5% 49 .5% 45 .1% 99 .1% 54 .9% 
6 201306 52 .9% 40 .9% 99 .3% 59 .1% 54 .0% 40 .8% 99 .3% 59 .2% 52 .2% 44 .2% 99 .2% 55 .8% 
Average: 48 .6% 43 .7% 99 .2% 56 .3% 49 .8% 40 .8% 99 .3% 59 .2% 49 .8% 44 .9% 99 .3% 55 .1% 
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14 Analogous plots for our C4.5 decision tree and random forest models look very accounts 60 days past due; and red points represent accounts 90
days or more past due. We plot each account’s credit bureau score
on the horizontal axis because it is a key variable used in virtually
every consumer default prediction model and serves as a useful
comparison to the machine-learning forecast. 
This plot shows that while credit scores discriminate between
good and bad accounts to a certain degree (the red 90 + days past
due accounts do tend to cluster to the left region of the hori-
zontal axis with lower credit scores), even the logistic regression
model is very effective in rank-ordering accounts in terms of riski-
ness. In particular, the red 90 + days past due points cluster heavily
at the top of the graph, implying that machine-learning forecasts sre highly effective in identifying accounts that eventually become
elinquent. 14 
Table 3 shows the precision and recall for our models. We also
rovide the true positive and false positive rates. The results are
iven by bank, time, and forecast horizon for each model type. The
tatistics are calculated for the classiﬁcation threshold that max-
mizes the respective model’s F -measure to provide a reasonable
alance between good precision and recall. imilar. 
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mAlthough selecting a modeling threshold based on the test data
oes introduce some look-ahead bias, we use this approach when
resenting the results for two reasons. First, banks are likely to cal-
brate classiﬁcation models using an expected delinquency rate to
elect the acceptance threshold. We do not separately model delin-
uency rates, and view the primary purpose of our classiﬁers as
he rank-ordering of accounts. To this end, we are less concerned
ith forecasting the realized delinquency rates than rank-ordering
ccounts based on risk of delinquency. Therefore, the main role of
he acceptance threshold for our purposes is for exposition and to
ake fair comparisons across models. 
Second, the performance statistics we report—the F -measure
nd the kappa statistic—are relatively insensitive to the choice of
odeling threshold. Figs. A1 –A3 in Appendix A show the sensi-
ivity of these performance statistics to the choice of acceptance
hreshold for the C4.5 decision tree, logistic regression, and ran-
om forest models, respectively. The three plots on the left in each
gure show the F -measure versus the acceptance threshold, while
he plots on the right show the kappa statistic. able 4 
 -measure and kappa statistic by bank and time. 
he table shows the F -measure and kappa statistic results by bank, time, and forecast hor
aximizes the respective statistic for a given bank-time-model combination. Panel A show
Panel A: 2Q forecast 3Q forec
Bank Test date C4.5 Logistic Random C4.5 
tree regression forest tree 
1 201106 66 .9% 27 .5% 68 .3% 52 .0% 
1 201112 66 .3% 37 .9% 66 .6% 50 .8% 
1 201206 66 .6% 61 .3% 66 .5% 50 .5% 
1 201212 66 .7% 62 .3% 66 .7% 48 .7% 
1 201306 63 .8% 58 .9% 63 .6% 43 .8% 
1 201312 66 .4% 62 .5% 66 .9% N/A 
Average: 66 .1% 51 .7% 66 .4% 49 .2% 
2 201106 68 .0% 67 .7% 68 .4% 51 .9% 
2 201112 67 .3% 66 .3% 66 .7% 48 .1% 
2 201206 64 .2% 6 .0% 67 .1% 51 .5% 
2 201212 68 .1% 17 .4% 67 .4% 48 .0% 
2 201306 66 .6% 66 .0% 66 .6% 50 .8% 
2 201312 67 .8% 66 .7% 66 .2% N/A 
Average: 67 .0% 48 .3% 67 .0% 50 .0% 
3 201106 84 .1% 78 .4% 83 .7% 62 .5% 
3 201112 79 .2% 77 .1% 83 .0% 62 .1% 
3 201206 82 .9% 77 .5% 81 .4% 61 .7% 
3 201212 82 .3% 75 .7% 82 .1% 63 .4% 
3 201306 79 .8% 75 .3% 79 .4% 66 .3% 
3 201312 81 .1% 76 .9% 79 .4% N/A 
Average: 81 .6% 76 .8% 81 .5% 63 .2% 
4 201106 62 .1% 59 .6% 62 .7% 47 .3% 
4 201112 65 .3% 59 .3% 64 .7% 34 .8% 
4 201206 62 .9% 58 .4% 61 .7% 45 .4% 
4 201212 64 .3% 60 .5% 63 .0% 44 .2% 
4 201306 63 .6% 61 .4% 64 .0% 46 .6% 
4 201312 64 .6% 62 .0% 65 .1% N/A 
Average: 63 .8% 60 .2% 63 .5% 43 .7% 
5 201106 71 .2% 67 .9% 71 .3% 36 .0% 
5 201112 69 .3% 67 .3% 69 .8% 35 .0% 
5 201206 67 .4% 64 .2% 68 .9% 36 .8% 
5 201212 70 .5% 67 .8% 70 .0% 35 .5% 
5 201306 69 .7% 68 .4% 70 .9% 38 .0% 
5 201312 69 .7% 68 .4% 69 .3% N/A 
Average: 69 .6% 67 .3% 70 .0% 36 .2% 
6 201106 68 .0% 65 .5% 67 .8% 47 .0% 
6 201112 67 .4% 66 .5% 67 .4% 47 .6% 
6 201206 71 .0% 70 .5% 71 .1% 48 .6% 
6 201212 58 .1% 69 .0% 69 .5% 49 .4% 
6 201306 52 .6% 70 .0% 70 .9% 49 .3% 
6 201312 67 .3% 66 .1% 66 .4% N/A 
Average: 64 .1% 67 .9% 68 .9% 48 .4% There are a few noteworthy points here. First, for each bank,
he optimal threshold remains relatively constant over time, which
eans that it should be easy for a bank to select a threshold based
n past results and get an adequate forecast. Second, in the cases
here the selected threshold varies over time, the lines are still
uite ﬂat. For example, in our C4.5 decision tree models in Fig. A1 ,
he optimal thresholds cluster by bank and the curves are very ﬂat
etween 20% and 70% of the threshold values for the F -measure
nd the kappa statistics. For the random forest models in Fig. A3 ,
he lines are not quite as ﬂat, but the optimal thresholds tend to
luster tightly for each bank. In sum, it is important to remember
hat the goal of a bank would not be to maximize the F -measure
n any case, and as long as the selected threshold is selected using
ny reasonable strategy, our sensitivity analysis demonstrates that
t would, in all likelihood, only have a minimal effect on our main
esults. 
Each of the models achieves a very high true positive rate,
hich is not surprising given the low default rates. The false posi-
ive rates are reasonable, between 11% and 38% for the two-quarterizon for each model type. The statistics are based on the acceptance threshold that 
s the F -measure and Panel B shows the kappa statistic. 
ast 4Q forecast 
Logistic Random C4.5 Logistic Random 
regression forest tree regression forest 
47 .9% 52 .8% 44.7% 31.4% 45.1% 
45 .7% 50 .7% 43.7% 39.5% 44.1% 
45 .5% 50 .2% 43.5% 39.2% 44.3% 
43 .7% 47 .4% 41.9% 36.1% 41.0% 
42 .9% 49 .2% N/A N/A N/A 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
45 .1% 50 .1% 43.5% 36.5% 43.6% 
49 .9% 51 .6% 45.1% 44.7% N/A 
47 .8% 48 .3% 46.3% 12.3% N/A 
9 .3% 51 .1% 45.3% 10.6% N/A 
15 .6% N/A 44.6% 20.7% N/A 
49 .6% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
34 .4% 50 .3% 45.3% 22.1% N/A 
57 .5% 61 .9% 54.4% 51.4% 54.7% 
58 .4% 62 .2% 50.5% 48.3% 50.5% 
59 .0% 62 .4% 50.2% 44.8% 51.0% 
59 .5% 63 .2% 51.0% 48.6% 51.1% 
61 .4% 64 .6% N/A N/A N/A 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
59 .2% 62 .9% 51.5% 48.3% 51.8% 
44 .9% 47 .9% 38.8% 37.8% 39.7% 
43 .4% 47 .1% 38.0% 36.2% 38.1% 
43 .8% 45 .7% 39.6% 38.1% 38.9% 
42 .1% 44 .4% 32.7% 38.2% 40.4% 
46 .0% 48 .3% N/A N/A N/A 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
44 .0% 46 .7% 37.3% 37.6% 39.3% 
32 .3% 38 .2% N/A 14.1% 13.8% 
30 .5% 36 .6% N/A 9.3% 13.8% 
30 .7% 37 .5% N/A 14.1% 14.5% 
31 .4% 36 .6% N/A 14.1% 15.0% 
32 .0% 38 .9% N/A N/A N/A 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
31 .4% 37 .6% N/A 12.9% 14.3% 
43 .7% 48 .3% 41.8% 37.5% 41.3% 
44 .7% 49 .1% 44.9% 41.7% 45.9% 
50 .1% 54 .3% 42.1% 44.3% 47.2% 
48 .1% 50 .8% 46.1% 46.5% 47.9% 
49 .6% 51 .4% N/A N/A N/A 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
47 .2% 50 .8% 43.7% 42.5% 45.6% 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 4 
(continued) 
Panel B: 2Q forecast 3Q forecast 4Q forecast 
Bank Test date C4.5 Logistic Random C4.5 Logistic Random C4.5 Logistic Random 
tree regression forest tree regression forest tree regression forest 
1 201106 69 .8% 49 .9% 70 .0% 60 .9% 59 .1% 61 .1% 57 .1% 49 .6% 57 .3% 
1 201112 68 .1% 49 .9% 68 .4% 59 .8% 57 .9% 60 .0% 56 .8% 55 .8% 56 .9% 
1 201206 68 .7% 65 .0% 68 .8% 59 .2% 57 .9% 59 .9% 56 .9% 55 .4% 57 .4% 
1 201212 68 .3% 64 .4% 68 .7% 58 .6% 56 .1% 58 .0% 56 .2% 54 .0% 56 .2% 
1 201306 67 .3% 61 .9% 66 .2% 30 .5% 56 .2% 59 .1% N/A N/A N/A 
1 201312 68 .4% 65 .7% 68 .7% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Average: 68 .4% 59 .5% 68 .5% 53 .8% 57 .5% 59 .6% 56 .7% 53 .7% 56 .9% 
2 201106 69 .2% 68 .7% 69 .1% 59 .2% 58 .7% 59 .0% 55 .2% 55 .0% N/A 
2 201112 68 .0% 66 .9% 67 .2% 57 .8% 56 .9% 57 .0% 53 .6% 48 .9% N/A 
2 201206 67 .9% 50 .0% 67 .9% 58 .9% 49 .2% 58 .2% 55 .5% 49 .1% N/A 
2 201212 68 .1% 49 .6% 67 .5% 57 .3% 49 .4% N/A 55 .5% 49 .1% N/A 
2 201306 67 .3% 66 .2% 66 .8% 56 .9% 56 .9% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2 201312 67 .9% 66 .9% 66 .3% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Average: 68 .1% 61 .3% 67 .5% 58 .0% 54 .2% 58 .1% 54 .9% 50 .5% N/A 
3 201106 83 .5% 78 .0% 83 .2% 67 .4% 64 .2% 67 .1% 62 .7% 61 .0% 63 .4% 
3 201112 75 .6% 76 .2% 82 .4% 67 .6% 64 .4% 67 .7% 61 .7% 60 .0% 62 .1% 
3 201206 82 .6% 77 .0% 81 .9% 67 .3% 65 .0% 67 .7% 60 .2% 56 .7% 60 .6% 
3 201212 81 .8% 75 .3% 81 .5% 68 .1% 62 .4% 68 .0% 61 .7% 59 .9% 61 .7% 
3 201306 77 .8% 74 .6% 77 .6% 69 .9% 65 .6% 65 .5% N/A N/A N/A 
3 201312 79 .3% 75 .6% 77 .4% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Average: 80 .1% 76 .1% 80 .7% 68 .1% 64 .3% 67 .2% 61 .6% 59 .4% 62 .0% 
4 201106 65 .3% 62 .9% 65 .1% 57 .3% 55 .6% 57 .3% 54 .8% 53 .9% 55 .2% 
4 201112 66 .4% 63 .2% 66 .6% −5 .9% 55 .8% 57 .9% 53 .9% 52 .9% 54 .3% 
4 201206 66 .3% 63 .5% 65 .2% 56 .6% 55 .7% 56 .8% 54 .4% 53 .5% 54 .4% 
4 201212 66 .9% 62 .8% 66 .0% 56 .7% 54 .9% 56 .2% 10 .2% 53 .7% 54 .7% 
4 201306 67 .7% 63 .4% 66 .0% 58 .1% 56 .1% 57 .7% N/A N/A N/A 
4 201312 67 .6% 64 .2% 66 .3% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Average: 66 .7% 63 .3% 65 .9% 44 .6% 55 .6% 57 .2% 43 .3% 53 .5% 54 .6% 
5 201106 72 .0% 68 .0% 71 .6% 21 .9% 49 .8% 53 .6% N/A 49 .8% 49 .8% 
5 201112 70 .0% 67 .7% 70 .6% 53 .3% 49 .8% 52 .9% N/A 49 .8% 49 .8% 
5 201206 69 .6% 67 .2% 70 .3% 52 .2% 49 .8% 52 .6% N/A 49 .7% 49 .8% 
5 201212 70 .2% 67 .6% 70 .0% 52 .4% 49 .8% 52 .7% N/A 49 .8% 49 .8% 
5 201306 70 .4% 69 .3% 70 .7% 52 .7% 49 .8% 53 .4% N/A N/A N/A 
5 201312 69 .9% 68 .7% 70 .0% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Average: 70 .4% 68 .1% 70 .5% 46 .5% 49 .8% 53 .0% N/A 49 .8% 49 .8% 
6 201106 68 .7% 67 .8% 69 .7% 47 .7% 57 .9% 58 .1% 55 .8% 55 .1% 55 .7% 
6 201112 67 .8% 68 .3% 68 .2% 52 .1% 58 .1% 59 .5% 53 .4% 56 .9% 57 .4% 
6 201206 72 .3% 72 .1% 72 .0% 40 .4% 60 .2% 61 .0% 36 .3% 56 .9% 57 .0% 
6 201212 34 .7% 69 .6% 69 .9% 59 .2% 58 .8% 59 .4% 51 .9% 58 .0% 57 .6% 
6 201306 13 .0% 71 .1% 72 .2% 47 .2% 57 .5% 57 .5% N/A N/A N/A 
6 201312 66 .4% 64 .4% 66 .3% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Average: 53 .8% 68 .9% 69 .7% 49 .3% 58 .5% 59 .1% 49 .4% 56 .7% 56 .9% 
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chorizon models. However, as the forecast horizon increases, the
models become less accurate and the false positive rates increase
for each bank. 
Table 4 presents the F -measure and kappa statistics by bank
and by time in Panels A and B, respectively. As mentioned above,
the F -measure and kappa statistics show that the C4.5 and random
forest models outperform the logistic regression models. The per-
formance of the models declines as the forecast horizon increases.
The C4.5 and random forest models tend to consistently outper-
form the logistic regression models, regardless of the forecast hori-
zon, for each statistic. 
Table 5 presents the value added for each of the models, which
represents the potential gain from employing a given model versus
passive risk management. Under this metric, the results are similar
in that the C4.5 and random forest models outperform logistic re-
gression. All the value added results assume a run-up of 30% and
a proﬁtability margin of about 13.5%. 
For the two-quarter forecast horizon, the C4.5 models produce
an average per bank cost savings of between 45.2% and 75.5%.
The random forest models yield similar values, between 47.0% and
74.4%. The logistic regressions fare much worse based on the bankverage values because Banks 1 and 2 show two periods of neg-
tive value added—meaning that the models did such a poor job
f classifying accounts that the bank would have been better off
ot managing accounts at all. Even omitting these negative in-
tances, however, the logistic models tend to underperform the
thers. 
Random forests are considered state-of-the-art in terms of out-
f-sample prediction performance in classiﬁcation tasks like the
ne considered here. It is possible that using more bagged sam-
les would further improve their performance, but given that their
conomic beneﬁt in performance (in terms of value added) over
he more easily interpretable single decision trees seems limited,
he single decision tree model may be a preferred alternative for
his domain. 
There is substantial heterogeneity in value added across banks
s well. Fig. 4 plots the value added for all six banks for each
odel type. All models are based on a two-quarter forecast hori-
on. Bank 3 is always at the top of the plots, meaning that it per-
orms best with our models. Bank 4 tends to be the lowest (al-
hough it still has a positive value added), and the other four banks
luster in between. 
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Table 5 
Value added by bank and time. 
The table shows the value added results by bank, time, and forecast horizon for each model type. The statistics are based on the acceptance threshold that maximizes 
the respective statistic for a given bank-time-model combination. Value added is deﬁned in Eq. (4) . Each value added assumes a margin of 5% ( r = 5%), a run-up of 30% 
(( B d - B r )/ B d ), and a discount horizon of 3 years ( N = 3). The numbers represent the percentage cost savings of implementing each model versus passive risk management. 
The proﬁt margin is used to estimate the opportunity cost of a false negative so that misclassifying more proﬁtable accounts is more costly. 
Bank Test date Value added – 2Q forecast Value added – 3Q forecast Value added – 4Q forecast 
C4.5 Logistic Random C4.5 Logistic Random C4.5 Logistic Random 
tree regression forest tree regression forest tree regression forest 
1 201106 51 .5% −63 .9% 53 .8% 32 .1% 26 .9% 32 .2% 22 .9% −9 .6% 21 .8% 
1 201112 51 .4% −20 .5% 51 .6% 30 .5% 24 .4% 29 .9% 22 .7% 15 .4% 21 .6% 
1 201206 51 .6% 43 .8% 51 .6% 29 .0% 23 .6% 28 .6% 20 .7% 15 .5% 21 .3% 
1 201212 51 .4% 45 .2% 51 .7% 27 .6% 21 .9% 24 .4% 21 .0% 14 .5% 18 .6% 
1 201306 47 .2% 40 .2% 47 .3% 12 .1% 21 .9% 28 .2% N/A N/A N/A 
1 201312 51 .0% 45 .4% 52 .1% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Average: 50 .7% 15 .1% 51 .4% 26 .3% 23 .7% 28 .6% 21 .8% 8 .9% 20 .8% 
2 201106 54 .1% 53 .4% 54 .4% 30 .2% 28 .6% 30 .8% 21 .3% 17 .9% N/A 
2 201112 53 .4% 51 .4% 52 .3% 26 .9% 23 .7% 25 .1% 24 .7% −471 .2% N/A 
2 201206 47 .9% −1201% 52 .5% 28 .0% −618 .7% 28 .7% 21 .3% −555 .0% N/A 
2 201212 53 .9% −209 .7% 53 .3% 25 .6% −171 .0% N/A 22 .3% −106 .4% N/A 
2 201306 51 .5% 50 .7% 51 .9% 28 .5% 26 .2% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2 201312 53 .8% 51 .9% 51 .3% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Average: 52 .4% −200 .5% 52 .6% 27 .8% −142 .2% 28 .2% 22 .4% −278 .6% N/A 
3 201106 78 .7% 69 .4% 77 .7% 45 .5% 39 .0% 44 .7% 35 .1% 31 .7% 35 .5% 
3 201112 73 .9% 68 .2% 76 .2% 44 .9% 40 .1% 45 .1% 31 .0% 27 .8% 31 .7% 
3 201206 75 .9% 68 .4% 72 .1% 44 .3% 40 .9% 45 .3% 29 .7% 22 .0% 30 .4% 
3 201212 75 .4% 65 .6% 75 .1% 46 .7% 41 .5% 46 .4% 31 .1% 27 .1% 31 .6% 
3 201306 74 .0% 65 .3% 73 .6% 50 .5% 44 .0% 48 .5% N/A N/A N/A 
3 201312 75 .0% 68 .4% 73 .4% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Average: 75 .5% 67 .5% 74 .7% 46 .4% 41 .1% 46 .0% 31 .7% 27 .1% 32 .3% 
4 201106 44 .8% 41 .1% 45 .7% 22 .8% 20 .8% 25 .8% 11 .0% 8 .7% 15 .4% 
4 201112 49 .8% 40 .2% 48 .9% −19 .6% 19 .2% 25 .3% 10 .1% 10 .0% 14 .4% 
4 201206 46 .0% 39 .5% 44 .2% 23 .9% 18 .3% 21 .8% 14 .6% 11 .8% 12 .5% 
4 201212 47 .9% 42 .5% 46 .2% 22 .1% 19 .3% 19 .7% −11 .9% 13 .4% 16 .4% 
4 201306 47 .2% 43 .9% 47 .7% 22 .2% 20 .8% 26 .9% N/A N/A N/A 
4 201312 48 .3% 44 .6% 49 .3% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Average: 47 .3% 42 .0% 47 .0% 14 .3% 19 .7% 23 .9% 6 .0% 11 .0% 14 .7% 
5 201106 58 .4% 53 .8% 59 .1% −1 .3% −1 .6% 11 .6% N/A −110 .0% −81 .4% 
5 201112 55 .9% 52 .6% 57 .0% 9 .9% −3 .9% 7 .2% N/A −36 .1% −40 .0% 
5 201206 52 .3% 47 .8% 55 .3% 11 .2% −24 .5% 10 .8% N/A −83 .2% −60 .3% 
5 201212 57 .9% 53 .7% 57 .1% 10 .9% −8 .2% 9 .9% N/A −124 .3% −64 .9% 
5 201306 56 .1% 54 .1% 58 .4% 13 .0% 1 .9% 13 .7% N/A N/A N/A 
5 201312 57 .1% 54 .4% 56 .2% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Average: 56 .3% 52 .7% 57 .2% 8 .7% −7 .3% 10 .6% N/A −88 .4% −61 .7% 
6 201106 53 .3% 49 .9% 53 .0% 23 .4% 20 .5% 27 .3% 19 .6% 15 .7% 18 .0% 
6 201112 52 .9% 51 .3% 52 .9% 25 .8% 21 .2% 27 .4% 24 .0% 17 .3% 23 .9% 
6 201206 57 .2% 57 .3% 58 .1% 22 .2% 28 .2% 34 .3% 13 .2% 23 .0% 24 .3% 
6 201212 35 .6% 55 .1% 56 .1% 28 .9% 26 .6% 30 .6% 24 .4% 25 .0% 25 .8% 
6 201306 19 .2% 56 .3% 57 .6% 25 .7% 26 .3% 30 .1% N/A N/A N/A 
6 201312 53 .1% 51 .2% 51 .6% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Average: 45 .2% 53 .5% 54 .9% 25 .2% 24 .6% 30 .0% 20 .3% 20 .2% 23 .0% 
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15 We plot the natural logarithm of this ratio in Fig. 6 , where values above zero 
should be interpreted as effective risk management. Moving to three- and four-quarter forecast horizons, the model
erformance declines, and as a result, the value added declines.
owever, the C4.5 trees and random forests remain positive, and
ontinue to outperform logistic regression. Although the relative
erformance degrades somewhat, our machine-learning models
till provide positive value at the longest forecast horizons. 
Fig. 5 presents the value added versus the assumed run-up.
he value added for each model increases with run-up. With the
xception of a 10% run-up for Bank 5, all the C4.5 and random
orest models generate positive value added for any run-up of at
east 10%. The logistic models, however, need to have a run-up of
t least 20% for Bank 1 to break even, and they never do so for
ank 2. 
.3. Risk management across institutions 
In this section, we examine risk management practices across
nstitutions. First, we compare the credit line management behav-
or across institutions. Second, we examine how well individualnstitutions target bad accounts. In credit cards, cutting lines is a
ery common tool used by banks to manage their risks, and one
e can analyze, given our dataset. 
As of each test date, we take the accounts predicted to default
ver a given horizon for a given bank, and analyze whether the
ank cut its credit line or not. We use the predicted values from
ur models to simulate the banks’ real problems, and to avoid
ny look-ahead bias. In Fig. 6 we plot the mean of the ratio of
he percent of lines cut for defaulted accounts to the percent of
ines cut on all accounts. A ratio greater than 1 implies that the
ank is effectively targeting accounts that turn out to be bad and
utting their credit lines at a disproportionately greater rate than
hey are cutting all accounts, a sign of effective risk management
ractices. Similarly, a ratio less than 1 implies the opposite. 15 We
eport the ratio for each quarter between the model prediction and
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Fig. 4. Value added by model type. These ﬁgures plot the value added as deﬁned by Eq. (4) over time. The statistics plotted are for the two-quarter horizon forecasts. 
Clockwise from the top left, the ﬁgures show the value added for C4.5 decision tree, logistic regression, and random forest models. Note the vertical axis is cut off at 0% and 
the logistic regression models for Bank 1 and Bank 2 are negative for the ﬁrst two and third and fourth time periods, respectively. 
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 the end of the forecast horizon under the assumption that cutting
lines earlier is better if indeed they turn out to become delinquent.
The results show a signiﬁcant amount of heterogeneity across
banks. For example, Fig. 6 shows that three banks (2, 3, and 5)
are very effective at cutting lines of accounts predicted to become
delinquent—they are between 4.8 and 13.2 times more likely to
target accounts predicted to default than the general portfolio. In
contrast, Banks 4 and 6 underperform, rarely cutting lines of ac-
counts predicted to default. Bank 1 tends to cut the same number
of good and bad accounts. There is no clear pattern to banks’ tar-
geting of bad accounts across the forecast horizon. 
Of course, these results are not conclusive, not least because
banks have other risk management strategies in addition to cut-
ting lines, and our eﬃcacy measurement relies on the accuracy of
our models. However, these empirical results show that, at a min-
imum, risk management policies differ signiﬁcantly across major
credit card issuing ﬁnancial institutions. 
4.4. Attribute analysis 
A common criticism of machine-learning algorithms is that they
are essentially black boxes, with results that are diﬃcult to in-erpret. For example, given the chosen pruning and conﬁdence
imits of our decision tree models, the estimated decision trees
end to have about 100 leaves. The attributes selected by the al-
orithm vary across institutions and time, and the complexity of
he trees makes it very diﬃcult to compare them. Therefore, the
rst goal of our attribute analysis is to develop a method for
nterpreting the results of our machine-learning algorithms. The
ingle decision tree models learned using C4.5 are particularly
ntuitive. 
We propose a relatively straightforward approach for combining
he results of the decision tree output, one that captures the re-
ults by generating an index based on three principal criteria. We
tart by constructing the following three metrics for each attribute
n each decision tree: 
1. Log of the number of instances classiﬁed : This is meant to cap-
ture the importance of the attribute. If attributes appear multi-
ple times in a single model, we sum all the instances classiﬁed.
This statistic is computed for each tree. 
2. The minimum leaf number : The minimum leaf number is the
highest node on the tree where the attribute sits, and roughly
represents the statistical signiﬁcance of the attribute. The logic
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Fig. 5. Value added versus run-up. These ﬁgures plot the value added as deﬁned by Eq. (4) versus run-up. The statistics plotted are for the two-quarter horizon forecasts. 
Clockwise from the top left, the ﬁgures show the value added for C4.5 decision tree, logistic regression, and random forest models. Note the vertical axis is cut off at -100% 
and the logistic regression models for Bank 1, Bank 2, and Bank 3 are negative for low values of run-up. 
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are between 89.8% and 94.3%. of the C4.5 classiﬁer is that, in general, the higher up on the
tree the attribute is (i.e., the lower the leaf number), the more
important it is. Therefore, the attributes will be sorted in re-
verse order; that is, the variable with the lowest mean mini-
mum leaf number would be ranked ﬁrst. This statistic is com-
puted for each tree. 
3. Indicator variable equal to 1 if the attribute appears in the tree
and 0 otherwise : We combine the results of multiple models
over time to derive a bank-speciﬁc attribute ranking based on
the number of times attributes are selected in a given model.
For example, we run six separate C4.5 models for each bank
using a two-quarter forecast horizon. This ranking criterion is
the number of times (between zero and six) that a given at-
tribute is selected to a model. This statistic is meant to capture
the stability of an attribute over time. 
We combine the above statistics into a single ranking measure
y standardizing each to have a mean of 0 and a standard devia-
ion of 1, and summing them by attribute. Attributes that do not
ppear in a model are assigned a score equal to the minimum
f the standardized distribution. We then combine the scores for
ll unique bank-forecast horizon combinations, and rank the at-ributes. This leaves us with 18 individual scores for each attribute,
sed to rank them by importance. The most important attributes
hould have higher scores, appear near the top of the list, and have
 lower numerical rank (i.e., attribute 1 is the most important). 
In all, 78 of the 87 attributes are selected in at least one
odel. Table 6 shows the mean attribute rankings across all mod-
ls, by forecast horizon, and by bank. More important attributes
re ranked numerically lower. The table is sorted by the mean
anking for each attribute across all 18 bank-forecast horizon pairs.
olumns 2–4 show the mean ranking by forecast horizon and
olumns 5–10 show the mean ranking by bank. 
It is reassuring that the top-ranking variables—days past due,
ehavioral score, credit score, actual payment over minimum pay-
ent, 1 month change in utilization, etc.—are intuitive. For exam-
le, accounts that start out delinquent (less than 90 days) are most
ikely to become 90 days past due, regardless of the forecast hori-
on or bank. 
Looking across forecast horizons, we see little variation. In fact,
he pairwise Spearman rank correlations between the attribute
ankings (for all 78 attributes that appear in at least one model)
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Fig. 6. Credit line cuts. The ﬁgures show how well banks target bad accounts and cut their credit lines relative to randomly selecting lines to cut. The targeted line ratio is 
deﬁned as the percentage of accounts that our models predict to become delinquent whose lines are cut relative to the total percentage of accounts whose lines are cut. A 
ratio of one (zero on a log scale) means a bank is no more active in cutting credit lines of cards classiﬁed as bad than accounts classiﬁed as good. Higher ratios signal more 
active risk management. The ratios for each bank are plotted on a log scale. The plots show the ratios for each quarter following our forecast through the end of the forecast 
horizon. Clockwise from the top left, the ﬁgures show the value added for C4.5 decision tree, logistic regression, and random forest models. 
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pHowever, there is a substantial amount of heterogeneity across
banks, as suggested by the pairwise rank correlations between
banks, which range from 46.5% to 80.3%. This suggests that the key
risk factors affecting delinquency vary across banks. For example,
the change in 1-month utilization (i.e., the percentage change in
the drawdown of the credit line) has an average ranking between
2.0 and 4.0 for Banks 1, 2, and 5, but ranks between 10.3 and 15.7
for Banks 3, 4, and 6. For risk managers, this is a key attribute
because managing drawdown and preventing run-up prior to de-
fault is central to managing credit card risk. Large variation in rank
across banks in other attributes, including whether an account has
entered into a workout program, the total fees, and whether an
account is frozen, further suggests that banks have different risk
management strategies. 
Overall, the results in Table 6 support the validity of our
models and variable ranking criteria, since the most widely
used attributes in the industry tend to appear near the top
of our rankings. However, looking across institutions, our re-
sults suggest that banks face different exposures, likely due toifferences in underwriting practices and/or risk management
trategies. 
There is also substantial heterogeneity across banks in how
acroeconomic variables affect their customers. Macroeconomic
ariables are more predictive (found among the most important
0 attributes) for Banks 2 and 6 in a two-quarter forecast horizon,
nd for Bank 6, at the 1-year forecast horizon as well. Although
hey are not the most important attributes, their ranking score is
till relatively high, showing that the macroeconomic environment
as a signiﬁcant impact on consumer credit risk. 
As mentioned above, we had also drawn the data previously at
hree other times. Using the data as of 2012Q4 (i.e., with 12 quar-
ers of data, from 2009Q1 to 2012Q4), our results showed a greater
ensitivity to the macroeconomic environment. These differences
re intuitively consistent, since the macroeconomic environment
rom the vantage point of 2012Q4 was quite different from the
acroeconomic environment of 2014Q2. These results emphasize
he dynamic nature of machine-learning models, a particularly im-
ortant feature for estimating industry relationships in transition. 
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Table 6 
Attribute analysis. 
The table shows the mean attribute ranking across all models, by forecast horizon, and by bank. For each unique bank and forecast horizon pair, the time series of C4.5 
decision tree models reported in Tables 3–6 are combined, and attributes are assigned a score based on (1) the number of instances classiﬁed, (2) the minimum leaf on each 
tree they appear, and (3) the number of models for which they are selected. The scores are standardized and summed to generate an importance metric for each attribute 
for each bank-forecast horizon pair. More important attributes have lower numerical rank. The table is sorted by the mean ranking for each attribute across all bank-forecast 
horizon pairs. Columns 2–4 show the mean ranking by forecast horizon, and columns 5–10 show the mean ranking by bank. In all, 78 of the 87 attributes were selected in 
at least one model. 
Attribute All 2Q 3Q 4Q Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 Bank 5 Bank 6 
models horizon horizon horizon 
Days past due 1 .4 1 .2 1 .7 1 .5 1 .0 1 .7 1 .0 1 .7 2 .3 1 .0 
Behavioral score 3 .7 3 .2 4 .3 3 .7 8 .3 1 .3 2 .3 3 .0 1 .7 5 .7 
Refreshed credit score 6 .3 7 .8 6 .0 5 .0 5 .0 8 .0 7 .0 9 .0 4 .0 4 .7 
Actual payment/minimum payment 6 .7 5 .2 6 .3 8 .5 9 .7 11 .3 3 .7 5 .7 5 .0 4 .7 
1 mo. chg. in monthly utilization 7 .8 5 .5 7 .8 10 .0 4 .0 3 .3 15 .7 11 .3 2 .0 10 .3 
Payment equal minimum payment in past 3 mo. (0, 1) 8 .6 7 .8 8 .5 9 .5 6 .3 8 .7 6 .7 10 .3 6 .3 13 .3 
Cycle end balance 9 .8 10 .8 10 .2 8 .3 11 .0 6 .3 12 .7 7 .7 17 .0 4 .0 
3 mo. chg. in behavioral score 11 .9 8 .8 16 .0 11 .0 3 .0 13 .0 13 .0 14 .0 12 .0 16 .7 
Cycle utilization 12 .1 19 .3 8 .7 8 .3 8 .7 21 .3 4 .7 22 .3 9 .0 6 .7 
Number of accounts 30 + days past due 12 .6 12 .8 12 .7 12 .2 18 .7 5 .0 10 .3 7 .3 13 .0 21 .0 
Total fees 15 .9 16 .2 12 .8 18 .8 15 .0 21 .3 8 .3 14 .3 9 .3 27 .3 
Workout program ﬂag 16 .8 23 .5 14 .2 12 .7 6 .7 19 .3 10 .3 4 .0 24 .0 36 .3 
Total number of bank card accounts 17 .8 18 .5 17 .5 17 .3 22 .0 21 .7 19 .0 14 .3 17 .7 12 .0 
Current credit limit 17 .9 18 .8 18 .2 16 .7 21 .0 7 .7 30 .7 16 .7 10 .0 21 .3 
Line frozen ﬂag (current mo.) 17 .9 17 .5 15 .7 20 .5 9 .7 16 .3 48 .7 1 .3 9 .0 22 .3 
Monthly utilization 19 .9 21 .5 15 .3 23 .0 16 .7 30 .0 42 .3 12 .0 13 .7 5 .0 
Number of accounts 60 + days past due 23 .2 22 .3 27 .2 20 .0 21 .0 19 .0 20 .7 18 .7 19 .3 40 .3 
3 mo. chg. in credit score 24 .4 21 .8 24 .2 27 .2 8 .7 27 .3 28 .3 21 .7 32 .3 28 .0 
Number of accounts in charge off status 26 .3 26 .0 27 .7 25 .2 27 .3 17 .0 24 .0 18 .3 39 .0 32 .0 
1 mo. chg. in cycle utilization 27 .0 29 .3 26 .7 25 .0 17 .7 38 .3 10 .7 30 .3 28 .3 36 .7 
6 mo. chg. in credit score 27 .1 28 .8 28 .3 24 .2 12 .7 42 .3 25 .0 41 .3 20 .3 21 .0 
Total number of accounts 60 + days past due 27 .9 21 .5 32 .3 30 .0 31 .7 24 .3 18 .0 11 .3 41 .3 41 .0 
Total balance on all 60 + days past due accounts 30 .2 36 .5 30 .5 23 .7 36 .3 28 .0 19 .7 17 .7 32 .3 47 .3 
Total number of accounts veriﬁed 30 .3 32 .3 28 .0 30 .7 46 .7 18 .7 42 .7 31 .0 24 .7 18 .3 
Flag if greater than 0 accounts 60 days past due 30 .5 36 .2 27 .2 28 .2 39 .3 42 .3 16 .0 36 .0 34 .3 15 .0 
Line frozen ﬂag (1 mo. lag) 30 .9 15 .5 34 .5 42 .7 16 .3 8 .0 33 .3 29 .0 47 .3 51 .3 
3 mo. chg. in monthly utilization 33 .4 30 .2 34 .8 35 .2 19 .0 22 .7 31 .7 42 .7 40 .0 44 .3 
Number of accounts 90 + days past due 33 .7 43 .5 29 .8 27 .8 34 .3 25 .0 33 .3 31 .7 36 .0 42 .0 
6 mo. chg. in behavioral score 34 .6 34 .5 37 .2 32 .2 36 .0 55 .7 22 .0 45 .3 21 .7 27 .0 
Account exceeded the limit in past 3 mo. (0, 1) 35 .3 28 .5 46 .0 31 .3 31 .0 23 .0 64 .7 28 .3 34 .0 30 .7 
3 mo. chg. in cycle utilization 35 .4 28 .8 33 .5 44 .0 29 .7 48 .0 29 .0 38 .7 18 .7 48 .7 
Flag if the card is securitized 36 .2 35 .5 36 .7 36 .3 24 .0 13 .7 30 .3 28 .7 71 .7 48 .7 
Total number of accounts opened in the past year 36 .4 41 .7 36 .0 31 .5 41 .0 24 .0 38 .7 45 .0 28 .3 41 .3 
Total number of bank card accounts 60 + days past due 37 .4 38 .5 32 .8 41 .0 47 .3 25 .0 23 .7 25 .3 40 .7 62 .7 
Total balance of all revolving accounts/total balance on all 
accounts 
39 .3 41 .0 34 .5 42 .5 30 .0 40 .3 43 .0 43 .3 33 .3 46 .0 
Total number of accounts 41 .3 34 .2 48 .7 41 .0 40 .7 26 .3 35 .3 32 .3 64 .0 49 .0 
Product type 41 .4 38 .5 41 .7 44 .0 20 .3 61 .0 73 .0 71 .7 11 .3 11 .0 
Unemployment rate 41 .6 41 .8 37 .2 45 .7 42 .3 36 .7 48 .3 54 .7 29 .3 38 .0 
Flag if greater than 0 accounts 30 days past due 41 .6 47 .7 39 .7 37 .5 55 .3 37 .3 35 .7 44 .7 22 .0 54 .7 
Purchase volume/credit limit 43 .4 43 .5 38 .2 48 .5 30 .3 58 .3 32 .3 70 .3 36 .0 33 .0 
Utilization of all bank card accounts 45 .2 53 .5 39 .5 42 .7 39 .0 54 .0 63 .3 52 .7 28 .3 34 .0 
Flag if greater than 0 accounts opened in the past year 45 .8 49 .7 44 .0 43 .8 64 .0 25 .7 56 .7 58 .0 38 .7 32 .0 
Flag if greater than 0 accounts 90 days past due 46 .2 47 .7 44 .8 46 .0 42 .7 38 .3 28 .3 54 .7 60 .0 53 .0 
Avg. weekly hours worked (private) (12 mo. chg.) 46 .2 44 .8 49 .2 44 .5 61 .0 37 .0 55 .7 42 .7 52 .3 28 .3 
Avg. hourly wage (private) (3 mo. chg.) 47 .7 49 .5 43 .2 50 .3 53 .7 56 .3 60 .0 45 .3 36 .3 34 .3 
Avg. weekly hours worked (leisure) (12 mo. chg.) 47 .9 49 .7 43 .0 51 .0 53 .3 40 .0 57 .0 60 .7 54 .3 22 .0 
Number of total nonfarm (NSA) 48 .2 53 .2 48 .2 43 .3 40 .7 54 .3 52 .0 48 .7 49 .7 44 .0 
Avg. weekly hours worked (trade and transportation) (12 
mo. chg.) 
48 .6 46 .7 51 .0 48 .2 49 .3 49 .0 34 .3 52 .0 51 .0 56 .0 
Avg. weekly hours worked (private) (3 mo. chg.) 49 .8 48 .2 44 .2 57 .0 48 .7 46 .7 53 .0 42 .3 50 .3 57 .7 
Number of total nonfarm (NSA) (12 mo. chg.) 50 .2 49 .7 45 .2 55 .7 45 .3 58 .0 50 .3 44 .3 49 .0 54 .0 
Avg. weekly hours worked (trade and transportation) (3 
mo. chg.) 
50 .3 50 .8 50 .3 49 .7 52 .7 44 .0 55 .0 61 .0 44 .7 44 .3 
Avg. hourly wage (trade and transportation) (3 mo. chg.) 50 .3 48 .8 50 .0 52 .2 55 .3 38 .0 61 .3 38 .0 54 .3 55 .0 
Total non-mortgage balance/total limit 50 .6 55 .0 46 .3 50 .3 51 .7 64 .7 55 .7 38 .7 46 .0 46 .7 
Avg. hourly wage (private) (12 mo. chg.) 51 .8 50 .3 53 .5 51 .5 56 .0 45 .7 59 .0 54 .0 47 .3 48 .7 
Avg. hourly wage (trade and transportation) (12 mo. chg.) 51 .8 57 .2 48 .8 49 .3 52 .0 55 .0 60 .0 47 .3 37 .3 59 .0 
Avg. weekly hours worked (leisure) (3 mo. chg.) 51 .9 52 .5 50 .5 52 .7 51 .3 43 .3 39 .7 59 .7 64 .7 52 .7 
6 mo. chg. in cycle utilization 52 .1 46 .7 54 .7 54 .8 33 .0 70 .3 48 .0 64 .7 38 .3 58 .0 
Avg. hourly wage (leisure) (12 mo. chg.) 53 .2 49 .0 53 .5 57 .2 47 .0 48 .3 53 .3 46 .3 62 .0 62 .3 
Avg. hourly wage (leisure) (3 mo. chg.) 53 .6 52 .7 52 .7 55 .5 58 .7 60 .7 62 .3 37 .3 66 .3 36 .3 
Total credit limit to number of open bank cards 54 .0 52 .0 52 .3 57 .7 68 .0 56 .0 45 .3 41 .7 49 .0 64 .0 
Number of total nonfarm (NSA) (3 mo. chg.) 54 .2 51 .3 55 .2 56 .0 62 .3 45 .0 54 .0 57 .3 40 .0 66 .3 
( continued on next page ) 
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Table 6 ( continued ) 
Attribute All 2Q 3Q 4Q Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 Bank 5 Bank 6 
models horizon horizon horizon 
Flag if total limit on all bank cards greater than zero 54 .8 50 .0 60 .2 54 .3 59 .3 72 .0 43 .7 33 .3 67 .3 53 .3 
Unemployment rate (3 mo. chg.) 55 .0 58 .3 53 .5 53 .2 52 .3 56 .0 68 .3 55 .3 52 .7 45 .3 
Number of total nonfarm (NSA) (3 mo. chg.) 55 .9 59 .2 64 .2 44 .3 58 .0 61 .7 50 .0 55 .0 62 .0 48 .7 
Total private (NSA) (12 mo. chg.) 56 .0 57 .5 53 .5 57 .0 53 .3 47 .7 54 .3 64 .3 56 .3 60 .0 
Percent chg. in credit limit (lagged 1 mo.) 56 .5 57 .0 52 .5 60 .0 66 .7 74 .3 10 .7 68 .7 58 .7 60 .0 
Unemployment rate (12 mo. chg.) 58 .3 53 .8 65 .3 55 .7 42 .7 66 .7 66 .7 61 .7 64 .3 47 .7 
Percent chg. in credit limit current 1 mo. 58 .4 60 .0 59 .7 55 .5 71 .0 74 .7 11 .7 65 .7 68 .7 58 .7 
6 mo. chg. in monthly utilization 58 .6 48 .7 65 .5 61 .5 46 .0 59 .0 50 .3 72 .7 62 .0 61 .3 
Flag if total limit on all retail cards greater than zero 59 .6 55 .0 60 .3 63 .3 62 .0 73 .0 63 .0 31 .0 76 .0 52 .3 
Total balance on all accounts/total limit 60 .5 55 .2 66 .2 60 .2 72 .0 56 .7 69 .0 57 .7 53 .3 54 .3 
Flag if greater than 0 retail cards 60 days past due 60 .9 68 .0 61 .8 53 .0 68 .7 43 .3 55 .3 63 .7 75 .7 59 .0 
Cash advance volume/credit limit 61 .7 64 .5 64 .5 56 .2 72 .7 47 .0 74 .0 63 .0 59 .0 54 .7 
Total credit limit to number of open retail accounts 67 .0 66 .7 67 .3 67 .0 70 .7 72 .7 74 .0 69 .7 67 .7 47 .3 
Line decrease in current mo. ﬂag (0, 1) 67 .8 68 .7 69 .0 65 .7 74 .7 75 .3 57 .0 64 .7 67 .0 68 .0 
Number of accounts in collection 68 .0 66 .0 73 .3 64 .7 69 .3 65 .3 76 .7 65 .3 73 .7 57 .7 
Flag if total balance over limit on all open bank cards = 0% 68 .1 65 .8 67 .0 71 .3 74 .7 76 .7 70 .0 63 .7 66 .7 56 .7 
Number of accounts under wage garnishment 68 .7 71 .2 68 .2 66 .7 75 .7 70 .0 66 .3 65 .3 67 .7 67 .0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 
Cross model results. 
The table shows cross model results. Panels A, B, and C show the results for the 
two-, three-, and four-quarter forecasts, respectively. The columns represent the 
bank used to train the data and the rows represent the banks used to test the mod- 
els. The ﬁgures in the table represent the mean value-added of the model forecasts 
across the time periods so the diagonal values in each panel correspond to the av- 
erage value-added numbers in Table 5. 
Test Model 
sample Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 Bank 5 Bank 6 Average 
Panel A: Two-quarter forecast 
Bank 1 50 .7% 17 .3% 43 .9% 41 .0% 37 .9% 3 .9% 32 .4% 
Bank 2 39 .9% 52 .4% 45 .4% 46 .6% 44 .8% 40 .5% 44 .9% 
Bank 3 −29 .6% 31 .8% 75 .5% 45 .6% 41 .8% 23 .2% 31 .4% 
Bank 4 41 .0% 42 .7% 1 .8% 47 .3% 40 .0% 8 .3% 30 .2% 
Bank 5 51 .0% 28 .1% 50 .9% 50 .7% 56 .3% 28 .2% 44 .2% 
Bank 6 49 .4% 32 .7% 22 .2% 53 .2% 51 .5% 45 .2% 42 .4% 
Column 
average 
33 .7% 34 .2% 39 .9% 47 .4% 45 .4% 24 .9% 
Panel B: Three-quarter forecast 
Bank 1 26 .3% 12 .8% 24 .8% −8 .7% 3 .5% 15 .2% 12 .3% 
Bank 2 24 .0% 27 .8% 24 .5% 11 .5% 14 .0% 19 .4% 20 .2% 
Bank 3 19 .9% 24 .4% 46 .4% 2 .2% 27 .2% 21 .0% 23 .5% 
Bank 4 18 .1% 3 .8% 15 .3% 14 .3% −21 .0% 3 .1% 5 .6% 
Bank 5 −0 .5% −15 .5% −1 .7% −7 .0% 8 .7% −17 .5% −5 .6% 
Bank 6 27 .1% 20 .3% 26 .7% 16 .3% 15 .5% 25 .2% 21 .8% 
Column 
average 
19 .1% 12 .3% 22 .7% 4 .8% 8 .0% 11 .1% 
Panel C: Four-quarter forecast: 
Bank 1 21 .8% 6 .2% 16 .7% −44 .1% N/A 12 .3% 2 .6% 
Bank 2 18 .6% 22 .4% 19 .2% −46 .7% N/A 17 .9% 6 .3% 
Bank 3 13 .8% 15 .9% 31 .7% −11 .2% N/A 18 .4% 13 .7% 
Bank 4 10 .9% −5 .7% 10 .4% 6 .0% N/A 2 .7% 4 .9% 
Bank 5 −58 .2% −1540% −80 .5% −53 .5% N/A −58 .5% −358 .3% 
Bank 6 21 .4% −627 .1% 19 .2% 6 .2% N/A 20 .3% −112 .0% 
Column 
average 
4 .7% −354 .8% 2 .8% −23 .9% N/A 2 .2% 
54.5. Robustness – cross bank model results 
The heterogeneity across banks could indicate that fundamen-
tal differences exist in the underwriting and/or risk management
practices across banks. In particular, the attribute rankings ex-
hibit substantial heterogeneity across banks which could reﬂect
cross-sectional differences in credit card portfolios. Alternatively, it
could be a result of poorly ﬁtted models that pick up substantial
amounts of noise. 16 
To address this concern, we run our decision tree models across
banks. For example, we train the data on Bank 1 and test the data
each of Banks 2–6. We repeat this for all pairwise combinations
of banks. The idea is that if the true underlying risk drivers across
banks are the same and our models are simply picking up noise,
then we should not see much degradation in the performance of
the models when applied to alternative banks; i.e., using a model
trained on Bank 1 ′ s data should perform about as well when tested
on Banks’ 2–6 data as compared to its own data. 
The results of the experiment are given in Table 7 . Panels A, B,
and C show the results for the two-, three-, and four-quarter fore-
casts, respectively. The columns represent the bank used to train
the data and the rows represent the banks used to test the mod-
els. The ﬁgures in the table represent the mean value-added of
the model forecasts across the time periods so the diagonal val-
ues in each panel correspond to the average value-added numbers
in Table 5. 
The results suggest that the models do pick up differences in
the underlying risk drivers across portfolios. This is highlighted by
the fact that the diagonal elements of each panel tend to be larger
than the off-diagonal terms, implying that the models are best
suited for the banks on which they were trained. Note that this
is not likely an over-ﬁtting problem as the models are still tested
strictly out-of-time meaning there is no look-ahead bias. From a
supervisory perspective, these results support our contention that
bank-speciﬁc models are likely to be better predictors of default as
opposed to a single model applied to all banks. 17 16 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out and suggesting this ex- 
periment. 
17 We refrain from analyzing any bank speciﬁc factors such as business or risk 
management strategies that could explain the cross-sectional differences to pre- 
serve the anonymity of the banks. 
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In this study, we employ a unique, very large dataset con-
isting of anonymized information from six large banks collected
y a ﬁnancial regulator to build and test decision tree, regular-
zed logistic regression, and random forest models for predict-
ng credit card delinquency. The algorithms have access to com-
ined consumer tradeline, credit bureau, and macroeconomic data
rom January 2009 to December 2013. We ﬁnd that decision trees
nd random forests outperform logistic regression in both out-of-
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it ondvantage of decision trees and random forests over logistic re-
ression is most signiﬁcant at short time horizons. The success of
hese models implies that there may be a considerable amount of
money left on the table” by credit card issuers. 
We also analyze and compare risk management practices across
he banks, and compare drivers of delinquency across institutions.
e ﬁnd that there is substantial heterogeneity across banks in risk
actors and sensitivities to those factors. Therefore, no single model
s likely to capture the delinquency tendencies across all institu-
ions. The results also suggest that portfolio characteristics alone
re not suﬃcient to identify the drivers of delinquency, since the
anks actively manage the portfolios. Even a nominally high-risk
ortfolio may have fewer volatile delinquencies because of success-
ul active risk management by the bank. 
The heterogeneity of credit card risk management practices
cross ﬁnancial institutions has systemic implications. Credit card
eceivables form an important component of modern asset-backed
ppendix A. Variables descriptions for tradeline and attributes d
Account level features Credit bureau features 
Cycle end balance Flag if greater than 0 accou
Refreshed credit score Flag if greater than 0 accou
Behavioral score Flag if greater than 0 accou
Current credit limit Flag if greater than 0 bank 
Line frozen ﬂag (0, 1) Flag if greater than 0 retail
Line decrease in current mo. ﬂag (0, 1) Flag if total limit on all ban
Line increase in current mo. ﬂag (0, 1) Flag if total limit on all reta
Actual payment/minimum payment Flag if greater than 0 accou
Days past due Total number of accounts 
Purchase volume/credit limit Total balance on all accoun
Cash advance volume/credit limit Total non-mortgage balance
Balance transfer volume/credit limit Total number of accounts 6
Flag if the card is securitized Total number of bank card 
chg. in securitization status (1 mo.) Utilization of all bank card 
Percent chg. in credit limit (lagged 1 mo.) Number of accounts 30 + d
Percent chg. in credit limit current 1 mo.) Number of accounts 60 + d
Total fees Number of accounts 90 + d
Workout program ﬂag Number of accounts under 
Line frozen ﬂag (1 mo. lag) Number of accounts in coll
Line frozen ﬂag (current mo.) Number of accounts in cha
Product type Total balance on all 60 + da
3 mo. chg. in credit score Total number of accounts 
6 mo. chg. in credit score Total credit limit to numbe
3 mo. chg. in behavioral score Total credit limit to numbe
6 mo. chg. in behavioral score Total number of accounts o
Monthly utilization Total balance of all revolvin
all accounts 
1 mo. chg. in monthly utilization Flag if total balance over lim
cards = 0% 
3 mo. chg. in monthly utilization Flag if total balance over lim
cards = 100% 
6 mo. chg. in monthly utilization Flag if total balance over lim
> 100% 
Cycle utilization 
1 mo. chg. in cycle utilization 
3 mo. chg. in cycle utilization 
Account exceeded the limit in past 3 mo. (0, 1) 
Payment equal minimum payment in past 3 mo. 
(0, 1) 
6 mo. chg. in cycle utilization ecurities. We have found that certain banks are signiﬁcantly more
ctive and effective at managing the exposure of their credit card
ortfolios, while credit card delinquency rates across banks are
lso quite different in their macroeconomic sensitivities. An unex-
ected macroeconomic shock may thus propagate itself through a
reater delinquency rate of credit cards issued by speciﬁc ﬁnancial
nstitutions into the asset-backed securities market. 
Our study provides an in-depth illustration of the potential ben-
ﬁts that “Big Data” and machine-learning techniques can bring
o consumers, risk managers, shareholders, and regulators, all of
hom have a stake in avoiding unexpected losses and reducing the
ost of consumer credit. Moreover, when aggregated across a num-
er of ﬁnancial institutions, the predictive analytics of machine-
earning models provide a practical means for measuring systemic
isk in one of the most important and vulnerable sectors of the
conomy. We plan to explore this application in ongoing and fu-
ure research. 
Macroeconomic features 
 days past due Unemployment rate 
 days past due Unemployment rate (3 mo. chg.) 
 days past due Unemployment rate (12 mo. chg.) 
60 days past due Number of total nonfarm (NSA) 
 60 days past due Number of total nonfarm (NSA) (3 mo. chg.) 
s greater than zero Number of total nonfarm (NSA) (12 mo. chg.) 
ds greater than zero Total private (NSA) (3 mo. chg.) 
ened in the past year Total private (NSA) (12 mo. chg.) 
Avg. weekly hours worked (private) (3 mo. chg.) 
l limit Avg. weekly hours worked (private) (12 mo. chg.) 
 limit Avg. hourly wage (private) (3 mo. chg.) 
ys past due Avg. hourly wage (private) (12 mo. chg.) 
nts Avg. weekly hours worked (trade and transportation) 
(3 mo. chg.) 
nts Avg. weekly hours worked (trade and transportation) 
(12 mo. chg.) 
st due Avg. hourly wage (trade and transportation) (3 mo. 
chg.) 
st due Avg. hourly wage (trade and transportation) (12 mo. 
chg.) 
st due Avg. weekly hours worked (leisure) (3 mo. chg.) 
garnishment Avg. weekly hours worked (leisure) (12 mo. chg.) 
 Avg. hourly wage (leisure) (3 mo. chg.) 
status Avg. hourly wage (leisure) (12 mo. chg.) 
t due accounts House price index 
House price index (3 mo. chg.) 
en bank cards House price index (12 mo. chg.) 
en retail accounts 
 in the past year 
unts/total balance on 
 all open bank 
 all open bank 
 all open bank cards 
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Fig. A1. Sensitivity to choice of acceptance threshold for C4.5 models. The ﬁgures on the left show the F -measure versus the acceptance threshold for each C4.5 model. The 
ﬁgures on the right show the kappa statistic versus the acceptance threshold. The acceptance threshold is given as a percentage. The dots designate the acceptance threshold 
that maximizes the respective statistic. 
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Fig. A2. Sensitivity to choice of acceptance threshold for logistic regression models. The ﬁgures on the left show the F -measure versus the acceptance threshold for each 
logistic regression model. The ﬁgures on the right show the kappa statistic versus the acceptance threshold. The acceptance threshold is given as a percentage. The dots 
designate the acceptance threshold that maximizes the respective statistic. 
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Fig. A3. Sensitivity to choice of acceptance threshold for random forest models. The ﬁgures on the left show the F -measure versus the acceptance threshold for each random 
forest model. The ﬁgures on the right show the kappa statistic versus the acceptance threshold. The acceptance threshold is given as a percentage. The dots designate the 
acceptance threshold that maximizes the respective statistic. 
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